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*Turning mortgage data  
into investment insight*

# GSE Reform: Risk Sharing and Cooperatives

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# Goals of Housing Policy

- ◆ Support sustainable home ownership
- ◆ Create a stable system for financing home ownership
- ◆ Protect homeowners from unfair practices
- ◆ Encourage or provide financing/credit to underserved communities
- ◆ Ensure that subsidies are provided effectively so as to minimize their cost and
- ◆ Reduce risk to tax payers of bailouts during market disruptions

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# What is a Mortgage?

- ◆ Documents
- ◆ Processes
- ◆ Financial Risks

# Financial Risks

- ◆ Funding
- ◆ Interest Rates
- ◆ Prepayments
- ◆ Credit
  - Origination
  - Systematic

# Financial Risks

- ◆ **Funding** (the \$10 trillion dollar question)
- ◆ **Interest Rates** (thrift crisis)
- ◆ **Prepayments** (86, 94)
- ◆ **Credit** (98, 07)
  - Origination (reps/warrants needs repair)
  - Systematic (the \$400 billion question)

# Funding Instruments


- ◆ GSE MBS
- ◆ Bank Deposits
- ◆ Home Loan Bank Advances
- ◆ AAA bonds



# Funding Instruments

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
# Flight to Quality and MBS



- ◆ September 2011: Jumbos widen 50-70 bp relative to FN30
- ◆ Feb 07-Dec 08: FN30s widen 50bps while Jumbos widen 350 bps

# Flight to Quality and MBS

Figure 1. Prices for New AAA Blocks of Jumbo A Loans



- ◆ Jul 98- Dec 98: During Russian Debt crisis Jumbos widened 25-35 bp (1 1/4 in price) relative to FN30 with sporadic trading at times
- ◆ Source: Paine Webber Mortgage Strategist


# Guarantees promote stability

- ◆ Government Guaranteed MBS help prevent a financial crisis from becoming a housing finance crisis
- ◆ Government Guaranteed MBS limit the spread of housing crisis to the financial system
  - 2007 financial meltdown was primarily due to CDOs and private label MBS
  - In 2008, GSE MBS did not widen significantly despite home price declines and weakness of GSEs

# Estimated credit risk of new originations

Base case loss of 25bp

Less than 1% probability of exceeding 4% to 5% of credit enhancement



# Economics of Tail Risk

- ◆ Expected loss of tail can be very small, with appropriate underwriting and credit enhancement
  - 3% shortfall, 1% probability, 3bp expected loss
- ◆ Additional 3% of private credit enhancement will have lower price than gov't guaranteed tail by about 2.5 pts (7.5bp)
  - Economically viable to have larger private credit enhancement
  - However, added “AAA” credit enhancement provides little or no incremental protection in “flight to quality”
- ◆ Government wrap will improve pricing of full MBS vs. private “AAA” by about ½ to 1 point
  - Government could charge 5 -10bp/year for wrap
  - Government wrap adds to economic efficiency and stability even if wrap fee exceeds expected loss (negative subsidy)

# Credit Risk

## ◆ Corporate Guarantee

- Fannie/Freddie
- Bank holding of MBS
- Mortgage Insurance
- Credit Default Swap

## ◆ Funded

- Home Loan Bank Advances
- Senior/Subordinated Structures
- Credit Linked Notes

# Future of the GSEs

- ◆ **Privatize**

- ◆ No government backstop for funding investors

- ◆ Private Capital for Credit Risk

- ◆ **Hybrid**

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**Fannie and Freddie should be selling off credit risk to private capital**

# Goals of Test Transactions

- ◆ Issue subordinate bonds or credit linked notes
  - Reduce risk to tax payer by bringing in private capital
  - Determine market based guarantee fees
  - Assess extent of market for agency quality credit risk
- ◆ Explore impact on TBA market
- ◆ Address structuring issues
  - QRM, Risk retention
  - Servicing, Reps Warrants
  - Systems, Reporting
  - Role of ratings agencies and risk measures
  - Legal/Tax/Regulatory issues

# Underlying Assumptions

- ◆ Public policy favors preserving the 30-yr fixed-rate mortgage
- ◆ The TBA market has valuable functions and should be preserved
- ◆ Government is the best and only guarantor of last resort for providing liquidity
- ◆ The Government is not well suited to pricing and managing credit risk (unlike liquidity risk)
- ◆ Capital is required to bear credit risk. With adequate capital requirements, private markets can price credit risk

# Underlying Assumptions - 2


- ◆ Public and private goals are not easily combined in one entity
- ◆ Securitization and portfolio activities are not easily combined in one entity
- ◆ Implied guarantees will be likely be abused and used to cross-subsidize businesses
- ◆ Cooperatives take less risk than shareholder companies
- ◆ Cooperatives redistribute monopoly profits into their customers or owners where they are subject to competition.

# Establish Securitization Utility


- ◆ Focused on securitization
- ◆ Limited ability to issue non-MBS debt
- ◆ Guarantee fee structure preserves current system and credit cost transparency
- ◆ Subject to Federal regulation
- ◆ Cooperatively owned by originators
- ◆ Limited number of charters (2 -5)
- ◆ Can be viewed as an “exchange” for credit risk

# MBS Credit Enhancement

- ◆ Coop enforces reps/warrants for improperly originated loans
- ◆ Coop bears first loss using equity from members
- ◆ Federal guarantee wraps MBS.
- ◆ Risk sharing for pro rata portion of cooperative loss
  - Provides market pricing of credit risk
  - Provides additional source of credit risk capital



# Cooperative Structure





# Advantages of Cooperatives

- ◆ Provides issuer/originator skin-in-the game
- ◆ Keeps excess profits in origination channel. Competition will deliver those to borrowers and investors
- ◆ Cooperatives provide for mutual enforcement of reps/warrants and underwriting standards, thereby limiting “race to the bottom”


# Issues with recommendations

- ◆ Determining appropriate level of subordination for government guarantee
- ◆ Determining appropriate underwriting guidelines for eligible MBS
- ◆ Determining equity requirement for cooperative
- ◆ Balancing interests of cooperative members
- ◆ Spreading prepayment risk in the economy
- ◆ Determining division between government, chartered utility and private markets

# Housing Finance System Overview

- ◆ FHA/GNMA deliver subsidized mortgages
- ◆ Home Loan Banks provide advances, but eliminate mortgage portfolios
- ◆ Encourage private mortgage market by limiting government guaranteed sector
- ◆ Regulation of origination process to provide consumer protection
- ◆ Consider replacing mortgage deduction with homeownership/long term rental tax credit

# Mortgage Market Components



# Proposal Meets Goals

- ◆ System supports sustainable home ownership by rationalizing credit pricing and limiting government support to appropriate mortgage products
- ◆ Utilities plus explicit guarantees provide a stable system for financing home ownership
- ◆ Regulating origination practices protects homeowners from unfair practices
- ◆ FHA/GNMA provides financing/credit to underserved communities
- ◆ Subsidies are provided explicitly through FHA and guarantees are paid for by investors rather than through implied guarantees and vague definitions of mission
- ◆ Explicit guaranty and higher capital requirement via subordination reduces risk to tax payers of bailouts during market disruptions