

*Comments on* **“Responding to a  
Shadow Banking Crisis: the  
Lessons of 1763”**

Conference to Honor Warren Weber  
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# Overview of the paper

- A relevant liquidity crisis to investigate
- A rich data set
- Central question –
  - How did Bank of Amsterdam avert “contagion” failures?

# What a data set!

- Cross-bank payments data
  - $X_{ik t}$ 
    - $X$  represents a transfer (amount)
    - $i$  is bank receiving the transfer
    - $k$  is the bank sending the transfer
- Many uses for this data – main one here
  - Analyze the contagion effects of a big failure


# Use of data

- Illustrate the liquidity needs of *banquiers*
  - Volume of payments relative to average balances
  - Reliance of the “parvenus” on new credit lines
- Seems like an “excess reliance” on refunding
  - *Sounds familiar* –
  - *Certainly* 2007-2009
  - But also 1873 and 1907

# Case of 1763

- How does the fringe intermediary earn profit?
  - Low per transaction return
  - High turnover – high leverage
- Interconnections – they have them in data
  - A parvenu failure can have large knock on effects
  - And “running out of balances” at the Bank of Amsterdam would be all that is necessary

## Payments relative to Average Balances



# Institutional knowledge shared


- Intensive analysis of existing contract design
- Comparison to modern securitized loans
- Question: How much is necessary to examine the issue of liquidity the provision of which may have prevented contagion?

# Provocative statement

- Bullion window lending as key to solution
  - Small channel => disproportionately large effects
- Simulation exercise and graphics display it
- The “why” of disproportionate effects
  - Accounts at the Bank of Amsterdam could never run out of bank money (no overdrafts)


# Run and Response

## Weekly position of Cazenove




# Figure 10: Simulated balances with no bullion window + 2 failures

## Horneca, July 1763-January 1764



## Hope, July 1763-January 1764




# The value of liquidity

- That last unit of account that would have prevented a negative balance
  - Important in these circumstances
- Relaxation of collateral standards
  - Crucial for increasing the supply of liquidity
  - May seem small –
  - But without it bad things could happen

# Transactions outside


- Runs on banks of deposit
- Extreme demand for coinage (not just for BoA collateral, but for day to day purchases)
- Description of the balance between bullion value as collateral vs bullion for minting
  - Fiscal and monetary policy coordination?

# Mint production of silver coins, 1740 to 1789



# Analogues in the National Banking Era


- Collateral requirements in panics
  - Issuance of clearing house loan certificates
  - 75 percent of “market” value of collateral
    - “Temporary” liquidity – exchanged at par at the clearing house (6 percent interest paid by borrower to the bearer of the loan certificate)
- What was used as collateral?
  - Assets that normally were not liquid



# Much liquidity added

- Bank of Amsterdam increased liquidity more through the normal discount of coin
  - In 1763 production of Bank discountable coin increased by about 45 percent (my guess)
- But the marginal addition of bank money by bullion collateral was still crucial
- This issue should be central to the revision

# Source of growth in Bank of Amsterdam Deposit Balances



# Final Comments

- Fight the urge to do more –
  - Try to maintain aim at contagion issue
- There is material to address many questions
  - Other papers can take on those question
- Great feat of economic history reconnaissance
  - My hat is off to y'all