Legal and Regulatory Update Executive Fraud Forum Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Jane Larimer
EVP ACH Network Administration
General Counsel
NACHA – The Electronic Payments Association
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A Network of Regulations and Authorities Govern Payments and Payments System Participants

FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REGULATORS

Responsible for ensuring safety and soundness of financial institutions

FDIC, OCC, Fed, State Banking Regulators, OFAC, FinCEN



CONSUMER PROTECTION REGULATORS

Responsible for ensuring financial laws protect consumers

CFPB, FTC and prudential regulators



Develop rules and standards that ensure certainty for participants

Card Networks ACH Network

Card Networks, ACH Network, Check System, Wire System

NACHA administers the NACHA Operating Rules that work in accord with payment regulations to ensure the safety and soundness of ACH Network payments.



Regulatory Guidance: Origination Activities

- OCC 2006-39: ACH Activities
- OCC 2008-12: Payment Processors
- FDIC FIL-3-2012: Revised Guidance on Payment Processor Relationships
- FDIC Supervisory Insights Summer 2011
- FinCEN FIN-2012-A010: Financial Advisory Risk Associated with Third Party Payment Processors
- FDIC FIL 43-2013
- FFIEC Exam Manual
- FFIEC IT Examination Handbook: Retail Payment Instrument Specific Risk Management Controls, ACH and Third-Party ACH Processing



FinCEN Advisory

- Risks Associated With Third Party Payment Processors
 - "Potential Red Flags for Illicit Use of Payments Processors:"
 - High numbers of consumer complaints and particularly high numbers of returns
 - TPPs maintaining accounts at multiple Fls
 - Consolidation Accounts this may be a legitimate account but TPPs can be used to conceal high return rates from ODFIs and regulators
 - Foreign located processors that process payment for telemarketers, online businesses and others
 - TPPs soliciting business with a distressed FI



FinCEN Advisory

- Risks Associated With Third Party Payment Processors (cont'd)
 - Guidance for FIs originating for TPPs:
 - Fls may need to update their anti-money laundering programs
 - Fls should determine during initial or ongoing due diligence whether:
 - external investigations or legal action are pending against a TPP or its owners
 - TPPs have obtained all necessary state licenses, registrations and approvals
 - FIs may need to file a SAR if they know, suspect or have reason to suspect that a TPP has conducted a transaction connected with illegal activity, including consumer fraud
 - Check the appropriate box on the SAR form, and include the term "payment "processor" in both the narrative portion and the subject occupation portion of the SAR



NACHA Operations Bulletin

- New York Times published an article on February 23, 2013, <u>Major Banks Aid</u> in Payday Loans Banned by States
 - "While the banks...do not make the loans, they are a critical link for the lenders, enabling the lenders to withdraw payments automatically from borrowers' bank accounts, even in states where the loans are banned entirely."
- ACH Operations Bulletin #2-2013: <u>High Risk Originators and Questionable</u> <u>Debit Activity</u>
 - Foundation: the ODFI is responsible for the valid authorization of all debits it initiates into the Network
 - Reminders of guidance that was previously issued in this area by the regulators, including OCC 2006-39
 - Elements of a robust risk management programs for ODFIs
 - RDFI responsibilities and practices
 - Responsibility to stop payment on one, multiple or all future debits
- ACH Operations Bulletin #3-2013: Reinitiation of Returned Debit Entries



Payday Lending

- The legality of the underlying transactions is in dispute: some payday lenders dispute the applicability of state law to online activity, and the tribes assert the sovereignty of federally recognized tribes
 - The ACH Network is caught in the cross-fire between payday lenders (including the tribes) and some regulatory entities
 - No regulatory expectation or NACHA Rule that requires an FI to know the legality of each underlying transaction – the expectation is to know the nature of the business of the originator and the risk it represents
 - RDFIs cannot screen, identify or block specific transactions
 - OFAC acknowledges the difficulty of screening domestic transactions
 - Reg GG
 - Lack of clear Federal direction or oversight



FDIC FIL-43-2013

FDIC Supervisory Approach to Payment Processing Relationships with Merchant Customers that Engage in Higher-Risk Activities:

- Issued September 27, 2013
- Clarifies FDIC's policy and supervisory approach for FIs that facilitate payment processing either directly or indirectly for higher risk merchant customers:
 - Perform proper risk assessments
 - Conduct due diligence to determine whether merchant customers are operating in accordance with applicable law, and
 - Maintain systems to monitor relationships over time
- Examination focus is on assessing wither FIs are adequately overseeing activities and transactions they process and appropriately managing and mitigating risks
- FI with appropriate systems and controls will not be criticized for providing payment processing services to businesses operating in compliance with applicable law



NACHA Rulemaking Initiatives

- Requests for Comment will be released on the following topics within the next several weeks:
 - Expanding the Network Enforcement Rules:
 - Lower threshold for unauthorized returns
 - Create new thresholds for administrative returns, and
 - Overall return rates
 - ACH Quality Fees
 - Reinitiation practices
 - Third Party topics



FinCEN Advisory

- Tax Refund Fraud and Related Identity Theft:
 - Issued to assist FIs with identifying tax refund fraud and reporting activity through the filing of SARs
 - The Advisory is intended to further the IRS' comprehensive strategy to prevent, detect and resolve tax-related identity theft crimes
 - Red Flag Examples:
 - Multiple refunds to different people are made to a single DDA
 - Opening multiple prepaid card accounts by one individual in different names using valid TINs – and subsequent mailing of the cards to the same address
 - Suspicious account opening on behalf of individuals that are not there, with the account opener being named as the signatory
 - FIs that know or suspect (or have reason to suspect) that a transaction involves proceeds from an illegal activity, is designed to evade the BSA, or lacks an apparent lawful purpose may be required to file a SAR
 - Use phrase "tax refund fraud" in the narrative section



NACHA Opt-In Program for RDFIs: IRS Refund Returns

- IRS and FMS requested NACHA's assistance in facilitating the recovery of questionable tax refunds sent via ACH
 - Previous IRS practice when receiving the return of an ACH credit (for example, due to incorrect account information) was to send a check
 - This practice assumed the tax return and refund are legitimate
 - IRS not able to validate tax return information against other data (e.g., W-2 statements) quickly enough
 - Under pressure to issue refunds as fast as possible
 - For fraudulent or other questionable tax refunds, the result is a lost opportunity to prevent loss of funds



NACHA Opt-In Program for RDFIs: IRS Refund Returns

- NACHA, IRS and FMS developed Opt-In Program for RDFIs
 - Provide a voluntary method for RDFIs to return ACH credits to IRS that does not automatically result in the issuance of a check
 - In cases of name mismatch between ACH entry and account record,
 the RDFI can return the ACH credit using the R17 return code
 - IRS normally receives near zero R17 ACH returns, so Opt-In Program returns are the only ones using R17
 - This unique identification allow IRS to segregate these ACH returns from other ACH returns
 - Available for 2012 tax filing season (beginning Jan 25)
 - Opt-In Program allows the voluntary use of a solution without the need to pass a rule that would require all RDFIs to implement



NACHA Opt-In Program for RDFIs: IRS Refund Returns

- Statistics as of September 11:
- 85 RDFIs participating
- 19,349 R17s have been sent, of which:
 - 11,843 (61%) were determined to be improper -\$46,522,484.52 recovered (\$3,928 average)
 - 7,506 (39%) were determined to be proper -\$16,469,724.08 released (\$2,194 average)



FFIEC: Statement and Proposed Guidance

- Statements versus Guidance:
 - An informational document versus the "thou shalts"
- Outsourced Cloud Computing Statement:
 - Issued on July 10, 2012, in response to questions received from FIs
 - Cloud computing is still a form of outsourcing with the same basic risk characteristics and risk management requirements as traditional forms of outsourcing
 - Third party vendor management guidance covers this as well see FFIEC Information Technology Examination Handbook - especially the Outsourcing Technology Services Booklet
 - Remember outsourcing does not relieve the FI of the obligation to ensure that the third party activity is conducted in a safe and secure manner!
 - A due diligence review must be performed, with thought given to:
 - How sensitive is the data that will be placed in the cloud? Is the data encrypted or protected?
 - Will the FI share data resources with data from other cloud clients? What controls are in place?
 - How will the provider respond to disasters and ensure continued service?



FFIEC: Statement and Proposed Guidance

- Social Media: Consumer Compliance Risk Management Guidance
 - Issued: January 23, 2013. Comments were due by March 24, 2013.
 - The proposed guidance is intended to address the applicability of federal consumer protection/compliance laws to activities conducted via social media
 - Would apply to FIs and non-bank entities supervised by the CFPB
 - Social Media defined as "a form of interactive online communication in which users can generate and share content through text, images, audio and video."
 - Examples include Facebook, Twitter, Yelp, LinkedIn, etc.
 - Used for marketing, providing incentives, facilitating opening new accounts, engaging with existing and potential customers or providing loan pricing
 - Since tends to be informal and happens in a less secure environment, it presents unique challenges



FFIEC: Statement and Proposed Guidance

- Social Media: Consumer Compliance Risk Management Guidance risk management expectations:
 - Fls should have a risk management program that allows them to identify, measure, monitor and control social media risks
 - Risk areas include:
 - Compliance and legal risks:
 - Must follow all applicable laws and regs translated into the social media environment (don't forget what you already know and do – and then translate)
 - Reputation risks including fraud and brand identity, consumer complaints and inquiries and employee use of social media sites
 - Remember users can post critical or inaccurate statements (!)
 - Operational risks includes the risk posed by an FI's use of IT
 - Social media platforms are vulnerable to malware



Questions and Contact Information

Jane Larimer

EVP ACH Network Administration

General Counsel

NACHA – The Electronic Payments Association

703.561.3927

jlarimer@nacha.org

