

# Aid, Remittances, and the Informal Economy

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- Developing countries have large informal sectors (Schneider et al., 2010, La Porta and Shleifer, 2014)
  - A significant fraction of the labor force is employed in this sector
  - Informal production: basic, non-traded goods and services, unregistered firms with extremely low productivity
  - Production is very labor intensive, with little or no access to credit and/or capital
  - Labor mobility from informal to formal sector is limited (skill requirements, regulation, entry barriers, etc.)
  - Informality declines with development, but transition is very slow

- Developing countries also receive large inflows of foreign transfers: aid (ODA) and remittances
  - ODA and remittances account for almost two-thirds of all international capital flows (Yang, 2011)
  - Aid: official transfer to the government, often with donor-imposed restrictions
  - Remittances: direct transfer to private residents, often working in the informal sector
  - These two sets of recipients operate under different constraints with different objectives
- **This Paper:** dynamic absorption of aid and remittances in the presence of a substantial informal sector.


# Foreign Transfers and the Informal Economy

Summary Statistics, 40 Developing Countries, 1999-2007

	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Med</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>	<b>SD</b>
Foreign Aid (%GDP)	5.69	1.91	0.01	33.63	7.69
Remittances (%GDP)	6.51	3.1	0.01	50.58	9.38
Informal output (%GDP)	41.84	41.64	16.07	68.12	11.43
Informal emp (%total emp)	53.69	59.6	6.1	83.5	20.32
Self emp (%total emp)	48.82	46.03	8.29	91.3	22.79

Data Sources: Schneider et al. (2010), La Porta and Shleifer (2014), WDI, OECD

**FIGURE 1. Foreign Transfers and the Informal Economy  
Selected Countries, 1999-2007**




— Share of informal sector in GDP (left vertical axis)  
- - - Share of foreign transfers (aid + remittances) in GDP (right vertical axis)

Data Sources: Schneider et al. (2010), OECD, WDI, and authors' calculations

# Foreign Transfers and the Informal Sector

Selected Countries, 1999-2007



## ● Literature on informal economy

- Measurement of size: Schneider and Enste (2000), La Porta and Shleifer (2008, 2014), Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2014)
- Tax evasion, enforcement, minimum wages: Rauch (1991), Ihrig and Moe (2004), Basher and Turnovsky (2009), Prado (2011), Ordonez (2014)
- *No analysis of the implications of foreign capital inflows*

## ● Literature on Aid and Remittances

- Implications for growth and macroeconomic adjustment of the **formal** economy
  - Burnside and Dollar (2000), Easterly (2003), Chatterjee et al. (2003), Giuliano and Luiz-Arranz (2009), Acosta et al. (2009), Mandelman (2012)
  - *No analysis of the informal or shadow economy*
- By embedding both the informal economy and foreign transfers in a general equilibrium model, we bridge an important gap in the literature

- **Two sector open economy model with imperfect labor and capital mobility**
  - *Formal sector*: produces traded goods, using CES technology, labor and capital
  - *Informal sector*: produces a basic non-traded good using only labor
  - Public infrastructure generates productivity spillovers for *both* sectors
  - Labor movement across sectors is **costly**
  - Private capital is traded but **internally immobile**, restricted only to formal sector
- **Households**: consume both goods, allocate sectoral labor, invest in formal sector firms, and receive remittances from abroad
- **Government**: taxes formal income (labor and capital), receives foreign aid, and provides public goods (infrastructure and public consumption)

- Formal sector:

$$Y_f = A_f F(K, L_f), \quad A_f = A_f(\bar{A}_f, K_G)$$
$$r_K = \partial Y_f / \partial K, \quad w_f = \partial Y_f / \partial L_f$$

- Informal sector:

$$Y_s = A_s H(L_s), \quad A_s = A_s(\bar{A}_s, K_G)$$
$$Y_s = C_s$$

- Choose consumption of both formal and informal goods to maximize

$$\int_0^{\infty} U(C_f, C_s) e^{-\beta t} dt$$

- Subject to

$$\dot{N} = r(\cdot)N + C_f + pC_s + \Omega - (1 - \tau)(r_K K + w_f L_f) - pY_s + T_f - R$$

$$\dot{K} = I - \delta_K K$$

- $N$  : stock of household (private) debt
- $R$  : remittance receipts from abroad
- $r$  : interest rate on household debt, given by  $r = r^* + e^{\omega(V/Y)} - 1$ , with  $r^*$  : world interest rate and  $\omega > 0$
- $V$  : aggregate economy-wide debt (public + private), and  $Y = Y_f + pY_s$  (GDP)
- $p$  : the real exchange rate (relative price of informal good)

- Let  $u$  represent the flow of workers leaving the informal sector:

$$\dot{L}_s = -u$$

- The rate at which the stock of formal employment is changing is:

$$\dot{L}_f = u - \frac{\chi}{2}u^2 - zL_f + \sigma L_U$$

- $\chi$  : intersectoral mobility cost
  - $z$  : rate of job separation
  - $\sigma$  : rate of job finding
  - $L_U$  : unemployment rate
- Labor market clearing condition:

$$L_f + L_s + L_U = 1$$

- Public debt and infrastructure accumulate according to

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{B} &= r(.)B + G_I^d + G_C^d - \tau(r_K K + w_f L_f) - T_f - (1 - \lambda)F \\ \dot{K}_G &= G_I^d + \lambda F, \quad \lambda \in [0, 1]\end{aligned}$$

- $\lambda$  : aid allocation parameter  $\Rightarrow$  proxy for institutional quality of recipient or donor intentions
- Current account:

$$\dot{V} = r(.)V + C_f + \Omega(.) + G_I^d + G_C^d - Y_f - R - (1 - \lambda)F$$

- $V = N + B$  : aggregate stock of debt (private + public)

$$\dot{K} = I(q_K) - \delta_K K$$

$$\dot{L}_f = \frac{q_f - q_s}{\chi q_f} - \frac{\chi}{2} \left( \frac{q_f - q_s}{\chi q_s} \right)^2 - z L_f + \sigma (1 - L_f - L_s)$$

$$\dot{L}_s = - \left( \frac{q_f - q_s}{\chi q_f} \right)$$

$$\dot{V} = r(\cdot) V + C_f + \Omega(\cdot) + G_I^d + G_C^d - Y_f - R - (1 - \lambda) F$$

$$\dot{q}_K = [r(\cdot) + \delta_K] q_K + \Omega_K - (1 - \tau) r_K$$

$$\dot{q}_s = r(\cdot) q_s + \sigma q_f - p \frac{\partial Y_s}{\partial L_s}$$

$$\dot{q}_f = [r(\cdot) + \sigma + z] q_f - (1 - \tau) w_f$$

$$\dot{q}_1 = (\beta - r) q_1$$

# Labor Market at the Steady-State

- Long-run unemployment rate

$$\tilde{L}_U = \left( \frac{z}{\sigma + z} \right) (1 - \tilde{L}_s) = \frac{z}{\sigma} \tilde{L}_f$$

- Sectoral returns on employment

$$(1 - \tau) \tilde{w}_f = \left( 1 + \frac{z}{\beta + \sigma} \right) \tilde{p} \frac{\partial Y_s}{\partial L_s}$$

Description	Functional Form
Utility function	$U = (C_f^\theta C_s^{1-\theta})^\gamma / \gamma$
Production-Formal Sector	$Y_f = A_f \left[ \alpha K^{-\rho} + (1 - \alpha) L_f^{-\rho} \right]^{-1/\rho}$ $A_f = \bar{A}_f K_G^\varepsilon$
Production-Informal Sector	$Y_s = A_s L_s^\eta, \quad A_s = \bar{A}_s K_G^\phi$
Borrowing cost	$r = r^* + e^{\omega V/Y} - 1$
Adjustment cost-Investment	$\Omega = I \left[ 1 + \frac{h}{2} \frac{I}{K} \right]$

**TABLE 3. Parameterization of the Benchmark Model****A. Structural Parameters**

<b>Parameter</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Value</b>
$\gamma$	Intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption	-1.5
$\beta$	Rate of time preference	0.06
$\theta$	Relative weight of formal-sector good in utility	0.5
$\omega$	Borrowing premium-Households	0.022
$r^*$	World interest rate	0.04
$\bar{A}_f$	Productivity level-formal sector	1.5
$\bar{A}_s$	Productivity level-informal sector	1
$\alpha$	Share of private capital in formal sector	0.4
$\varepsilon$	Output elasticity of public capital-formal sector	0.15
$\phi$	Output elasticity of public capital-informal sector	0.15
$s_f$	Elasticity of substitution in formal sector production	1
$h$	Adjustment cost for investment	15
$\delta_K$	Depreciation rate for private capital (annual)	0.08
$\delta_G$	Depreciation rate for public capital (annual)	0.07
$\eta$	Share of labor in informal sector production	0.75
$z$	Rate of job separation	0.01
$\sigma$	Rate of job finding	0.05
$\chi$	Labor mobility cost	15
$\lambda$	Aid allocation to public investment	0.35
$\tau$	Tax rate on formal sector output	0.3


**TABLE 4. Benchmark Steady-State Equilibrium**

<b>Endogenous Variables</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Model</b>	<b>Data*</b>	<b>Data Source</b>
$K_G/K$	Ratio of public to private capital	0.640	0.676	Gupta et al. (2014)
$C/Y$	Aggregate consumption-output ratio	0.813	0.803	WDI
$K/Y$	Aggregate capital-output ratio	1.279	1.163	Gupta et al. (2014)
$B/Y$	Public debt-output ratio	0.605	0.604	WDI
$N/Y$	Private debt-output ratio	0.295	0.299	WDI
$Y_f/Y$	Share of formal sector in GDP	0.593	0.582	Schneider et al. (2010)
$L_f/L$	Share of formal employment (in total employment)**	0.426	0.463	ILO
$L_U$	Unemployment rate	0.086	0.086	WDI
$p$	Real exchange rate	0.827	0.973	UNCTAD
<b>Calibrated Variables</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Model</b>	<b>Data*</b>	<b>Data Source</b>
$G_I/Y$	Share of public investment in GDP	0.026	0.026	GFS
$G_C/Y$	Share of public consumption in GDP	0.143	0.143	WDI
$F/Y$	Foreign aid (share of GDP)	0.057	0.057	OECD (DRS)
$R/Y$	Remittances (share of GDP)	0.065	0.065	WDI

\*Sample averages for 40 developing countries for the period 1999-2007.

\*\*Employment share of the formal sector is for the latest year available in the ILO database (between 1999-2007).

**FIGURE 2: Aggregate Foreign Aid Shock**




All variables are plotted as percentage deviations from their pre-shock steady state levels

**Steady-State Effects**

	$dY_f/Y$	$dL_f/L$	$dL_U$	$dK$	$dC$	$dY$	$dV$	$dp$	Welfare Change
Foreign aid shock	-0.836	-1.176	-1.076	2.402	4.526	3.265	3.265	1.638	3.375

**FIGURE 3: Remittance Shock**




All variables are plotted as percentage deviations from their pre-shock steady state levels

**Steady-State Effects**

	$dY_f/Y$	$dL_f/L$	$dL_U$	$dK$	$dC$	$dY$	$dV$	$dp$	<b>Welfare Change</b>
Foreign aid shock	-0.836	-1.176	-1.076	2.402	4.526	3.265	3.265	1.638	3.375
<b>Remittance Shock</b>	<b>-0.924</b>	<b>-1.299</b>	<b>-1.189</b>	<b>-1.189</b>	<b>1.078</b>	<b>-0.267</b>	<b>-0.267</b>	<b>0.268</b>	<b>1.629</b>

**FIGURE 4: Change in the Composition of Foreign Aid**




\_\_\_\_\_ Increase in "tying" ( $\lambda = 0.35$  to  $0.4$ )    - - - - - "Decrease in "tying" ( $\lambda = 0.35$  to  $0.30$ )

All variables are plotted as percentage deviations from their pre-shock steady state levels


	$dY_f/Y$	$dL_f/L$	$dL_U$	$dK$	$dC$	$dY$	$dV$	$dp$	<b>Welfare Change</b>
More "tying" to public investment	0.139	0.197	0.179	2.549	2.199	2.407	2.407	0.898	1.024
Less "tying" to public investment	-0.138	-0.195	-0.178	-2.719	-2.389	-2.586	-2.586	-0.987	-1.113

**FIGURE 5: The Sectoral Elasticity of Public Capital, the Composition of Aid, and Welfare**

**A. Steady-State Welfare Level**




$\varepsilon = 0.15$




$\phi = 0.15$

**B. Intertemporal Welfare Changes**



$\varepsilon = 0.15$



$\phi = 0.15$

---  $\phi = 0$    -.-  $\phi = 0.05$    —  $\phi = 0.15$    ···  $\phi = 0.30$

···  $\varepsilon = 0$    ---  $\varepsilon = 0.05$    —  $\varepsilon = 0.15$    -.-  $\varepsilon = 0.30$

# Sensitivity Analysis

- Sectoral elasticity of public capital (infrastructure) ( $\varepsilon$ ,  $\phi$ )
- Output elasticity of labor in the informal sector ( $\eta$ )
- Elasticity of substitution in formal sector production ( $\rho$ )
- Labor mobility costs ( $\chi$ ,  $\sigma$ , and  $z$ )

# Conclusions

- Effect of foreign transfers on informality, in the presence of imperfect labor and capital mobility
- Both foreign aid and remittances are associated with more informality (output and employment), **but**
  - the composition of aid matters: investment aid reduces informality, but diversion from investment increases informality and leads to economic contraction
  - remittances generate a short-run economic expansion, but a long-run "Dutch Disease" effect
- Real exchange rate dynamics depend on the type of transfer and composition
- Welfare: optimal degree of "tying" exists, around 30-40%, with diminishing returns from tying too much aid to public investment