

Is there an Optimal Implementation Framework?

November 2016 Central Bank Conference Day-Ahead, Nashville Paula Tkac, VP and Senior Economist

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Components of a Monetary Policy Implementation Framework



- Balance Sheet active policies and financial stability
- Policy Rate/Target Rate unsecured v. secured
- Operating Regime flat v. steep portion of the reserve demand curve
- Liquidity provision separation from or integration into operating regime

Subject to Normalization Principles (Sept. 2014)

- Holding no more securities than necessary to implement monetary policy efficiently and effectively.
- The assets held by the FRS will consist mainly of US Treasury Securities.

Assessing the Options

Framework Objectives



- I. Achieving appropriate control over short-term interest rates including during periods of financial distress and in a manner robust to structural changes in the financial system.
- II. Enhancing the ability of the FRS to achieve macroeconomic and financial stability objectives at the zero bound.
- III. Supporting the System's ability to address liquidity strains in money markets and support overall financial stability.
- IV. Reduce burdens and deadweight losses associated with reserve requirements.
- V. Promote efficient, active and resilient money markets and government securities markets.
- VI. Promote and efficient and resilient payment system.

Assessing Alternative Policy Rates

Choices and Criteria



Choices

- Market Rates
 - Unsecured: Fed Funds Rate and Overnight Bank Funding Rate
 - Secured: GC Treasury Repo Rate
- Administered Rates
 - Interest on Reserves
 - ON RRP offering rate

Criteria

- Controllability
- Transmission
- Robustness

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Is there an Optimal Policy Rate Choice?



- Staff are confident control can be achieved with either unsecured or secured rates
- US money market rates are highly correlated + Foreign experience suggests transmission is good with market or administered rates
- Changes in business models and regulations may change patterns of interconnectedness
 - GLIR
 - Administered Rates
- Clarity of communication involves intentions and response functions

Components of an Operating Regime



- Ceiling standing lending facility
- Floor deposit facility or interest on reserves
- Discretionary open market operations move the supply curve
- Level of reserves and use of voluntary or mandatory reserve targets – shape the demand curve for reserves

Operating Regime - Case 1 (Current)

TEDERAL RESERVE BANK

Case 1 Unsecured or IOER rate / Flat portion of reserve demand curve Case 2 Unsecured or IORR rate / Steep portion of reserve demand curve

Case 3 Repo Rate

- Floor tools would be particularly important
- Ceiling tools could be useful to contain rate volatility
- Reserve requirements would be unnecessary
- What is the appropriate level of reserves?

Details: FFR or OBFR? Political economy concerns with IOER/ON RRP spread

Assessment:

Sufficient Control Liquidity easy since reserves unrelated to rate control Can eliminate DW loss of reserve requirements Supports active money markets Supports early payment settlement



Operating Regime – Case 2 (pre-Crisis)

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Case 1 Unsecured or IOER rate / Flat portion of reserve demand curve Case 2 Unsecured or IORR rate / Steep portion of reserve demand curve

Case 3 Repo Rate

- Key tool is reserve requirements, eitner mandatory or voluntary
- Discretionary OMOs would play an important role in offsetting volatile autonomous factors
- Ceiling and floor tools help limit the volatility of interest rates

Details:

FF market would likely return but could disappear again at ZLB DIRF and FIRF as ceiling tools Could eliminate need for ON RRP

Assessment

Sufficient control with OMO Tools needed to sterilize liquidity or transition to Case 1 VRT reduces DWL Support money market activity Support payment activity with VRT

Operating Regime - Case 3 (repo)

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Case 1 Unsecured or IOER rate / Flat portion of reserve demand curve Case 2 Unsecured or IORR rate / Steep portion of reserve demand curve

Case 3 Repo Rate

- Key tools are ceiling and floor: ON RP and ON RRP facilities
- Level of reserve balances may impact unsecured rates volatility
- Reserve requirements and discretionary OMOs may not be necessary
- Counterparties and parameter settings of the facilities could affect interest rate control

Assessment: Can target successfully but may require large/frequent ops

Ample provision of liquidity with ON RRP Can eliminate DWL Supports money market activity broadly Supports payment system efficiency



Overall Assessment

Comparing Cases 1-3



- All likely achieve rate control
 - Case 2 requires OMO and FF market comes back
 - Cases 1 and 3, FF market vulnerable
- Providing liquidity is easy in Case 1 and Case 3 (if large reserves)
 - Case 2 requires sterilization, as does Case 3 if scarce reserves
 - Transition to ZLB/flat portion would require restart of RRP facility if decommissioned
- Cases 1 and 3 can operate w/o reserve requirements, Case 2 would use VRT
- All cases support money markets
- All frameworks have sufficient reserves to support payment efficiency

Other Factors



- Governance: BoG has authority over IOER, FOMC over ON RRP
- Political economy considerations: counterparties and interest on reserves
- Are expanded counterparties needed? Frictions may be high in times of stress
- Liquidity provision tools:
 - Full integration
 - Conditional
 - Inactive
 - Counterparties and Collateral: moral hazard and liquidity transformation