SMALL BANKS AND FINTECH LENDING COMMENTS

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Financial System of the Future

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Georgia State University
Atlanta 2019

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- Small banks' reallocation levels
 - three times as responsive as shadow bank lenders
 - eight times as responsive as fintech lenders

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- Capital market incentives for small bank lending

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- As well as declining numbers of small banks
- May lead to fintech opportunities.

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- Small bank: less than \$2 billion in assets
- Small bank share: percent of county bank branches owned by a small bank (0.583)

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- A decrease of one standard deviation in a county's *small bank share* is associated with an *increase in Prosper loan volume* of 6.9% to 8.4%.
- Fintech loan volume is **negatively** related to the *number of small bank branches* and **positively** related to the *number of large bank branches*.
- Same findings for small bank loan volume

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- Are there capital market incentives at work?

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- Is fintech lending competitive?

Why are small banks disappearing?

- Hughes, Jagtiani, Mester, and Moon, Journal of Banking and Finance, 2019
- Top-tier bank holding companies
- At year-end 2003, 2013, 2016

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- ROA Shortfall, the difference between the Best-Practice ROA and observed ROA, is lower at large community banks than at small community banks.
- Large community banks and midsize banks show better potential performance per unit of risk than small community banks.

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- Thus, there appear to be incentives for small banks to grow larger.


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
- We find that small business loans are an important factor explaining large community banks' better performance compared to small community banks.
- Unlike small community banks, large community banks have financial incentives to increase lending to small businesses.
- Thus, concern that small business lending would be adversely affected if small community banks find it beneficial to increase their scale is not supported by our results.

- Xuan (Sarah) Zou (2019)
- Top-tier bank holding companies
- 2001 2017
- Cross sectional and panel data


Tobin's q and SBL/Assets



Tobin's *q* and Substitution of SBL for LBL



Tobin's q and Substitution of SBL for Nonbusiness Loans



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- 2016 Median Nonperforming Loan Ratios by Volume of Unsecured Consumer Lending

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All	0.0181	0.0215	0.0218	0.0420	0.0496
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- How much of nonperformance is due to lending to riskier borrowers who default more often?
- How much is due to inefficiency at assessing and managing credit risk?

- Use stochastic frontier estimation to decompose the nonperforming unsecured consumer loan ratio into
 - The best-practice minimum ratio that a lender could achieve if it were fully efficient at credit-risk evaluation and loan management
 - inherent credit risk
 - The portion due to less skill at assessing credit risk and managing loans
 - lending performance inefficiency

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 - lending performance inefficiency (difference between observed and minimum nonperformance)

- Top-tier US bank holding companies
- LendingClub
- Year-end 2013 and 2016
- Stochastic frontier analysis to estimate minimum best-practice conditional on
 - scale of lending (lending technology)
 - economic conditions in a lender's local markets
 - average contractual interest rate on consumer loans

 LendingClub's NPL ratio resembles that of the large consumer lenders.

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Capital Market Incentives

- Why are small community banks disappearing?
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- At large banks?
- Is fintech lending competitive with large banks? Community banks?