# Banks, Nonbanks, and Interest Rates




#### **Bank Assets**

- Since 2021, the Fed has raised short-term rates by 5%
  - long-term rates, which reflect expected future short rates, are up 2.5%
- Banks hold \$17T of long-term loans and securities with average duration 4 years
  - implied loss of 0.025 x 4 x 17 = \$1.7T
  - not hidden or complicated
  - very large compared to \$2.2T bank equity



## Bank Stocks Held Up Through February; Down 30% in April






## The Deposit Franchise

- What makes banks special is issuing deposits
  - Depositors value their convenience and safety
  - willing to accept very low deposit rates
- When rates rise, deposits become much more profitable for banks
  - "deposit beta" of 0.4 means that deposit rates rise only 0.4% for every 1% Fed funds rate increase
  - banks capture the other 0.6 x Fed funds rate



## **Deposit Rates**






#### Big 4 Banks' Deposit Costs and Mixes





## Historical Deposit Betas




Deposits betas during this cycle are (still) far below historical betas

## The Deposit Franchise Hedge

- There are \$17.5T of deposits
  - banks earning 5% x 0.6 = 3% deposit spread
  - $-0.03 \times 17.5 = $525B$  more income per year!
- Enough to offset losses on assets in 3 years
  - deposits went from unprofitable to extremely profitable
  - baseline estimate suggests a full offset,
  - explains why bank stocks didn't fall through Feb
  - Generates stable net interest margin (NIM)




### Stable Net Interest Margin (1955-2018)





#### Stable Net Interest Margin (2018-2023)



Source: FRED Quarterly Banking Profile




## Deposit Risks

- Deposit hedge only works if deposits stay in the bank
  - Runs destroy the deposit franchise and the hedge fails
  - Regional lenders with uninsured deposits are at risk
- Deposit beta may "reset"
  - Uninsured depositors "wake up" and move to higherpaying alternatives outside the banking sector
- 3. Regular monetary policy ("deposits channel")
  - Price-sensitive depositors move as deposits become more expensive




#### Regional Bank -> Large Bank Deposit Flows



- After SVB failed, \$240B in deposits went from regional to large banks
- Anecdotally, banks have to pay <u>significantly higher deposit rates</u>
- Creates opportunities for non-bank lenders




#### Bank deposits → Money Market Funds (MMFs)



- About \$550 billion moved from banks to MMFs (~3% of deposits)
- Most of deposit outflows went to institutional funds



#### Deposits channel at work



- Deposit channel outflows <u>before SVB failure</u>: ~\$20B/week
- Average weekly outflows in <u>April and May 23</u>: ~\$20B/week
- → (Presumably) intended effect of monetary policy tightening