Structural Change within the Service Sector and the Future of Baumol Disease*

Georg Duernecker (University of Munich, CEPR, and IZA)
Berthold Herrendorf (Arizona State University)
Ákos Valentinyi (University of Manchester, MTA KRTK, CEPR)

July 30, 2017

Abstract

Unbalanced growth slowdown is the reduction in aggregate productivity growth that results from the reallocation of economic activity to industries with low productivity growth. We show that unbalanced growth slowdown has considerably reduced past U.S. productivity growth and we assess by how much it will reduce future U.S. productivity growth. To achieve this, we build a novel model that generates the unbalanced growth slowdown of the postwar period. The model makes the surprising prediction that future reductions in aggregate productivity growth are limited. The reason for this is that the stagnant industries do not take over the model economy.

Keywords: Productivity Slowdown; Structural Transformation; Unbalanced Growth.
JEL classification: O41; O47; O51.

*For comments and suggestions, we thank Zsófia Bárány, Marti Mastieri, Rachel Ngai, Richard Rogerson, Michael Sposi, and Gustavo Ventura. We also thank the audiences of presentations at Arizona State University, the Economic Growth and Fluctuations Group of the Barcelona Summer Forum 2017, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the CEPR European Summer Symposium of International Macroeconomics 2017, the Christmas Meeting of the German Expat Economists 2016, the European Monetary Forum 2016 at the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta and St. Louis, the RIDGE Workshop on Growth and Development 2016, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the SED Meeting 2017, Southern Methodist University, the University of Manchester, Western University, and the World Bank. All errors are our own.
1 Introduction

There is ample evidence that long–term economic growth has slowed in the U.S. The left panel of Figure 1 shows this by plotting the average growth rates of U.S. aggregate labor productivity during the previous 20 years where labor productivity is measured as real value added per hour. We can see that labor productivity growth declined by about a percentage point from an average of around 2.5% during 1950–1970 to around 1.5% during 1990–2010. Although we focus on the U.S. in this paper, growth slowdown has happened in other rich countries too. The right panel of Figure 1 shows similar downward trends for the three English–speaking countries Australia, Canada, and the U.K. We choose them as comparisons because they are rich countries that after World War II did not experience exceptionally large growth rates as the result of growth miracles (like Japan and South Korea) or of massive reconstruction efforts (like France and Germany).

One of the hotly debated questions of the moment is whether growth slowdown is a temporary or a permanent phenomenon. Fernald and Jones (2014) pointed out that engines of economic growth like education or research and development require the input of time which cannot be increased ad infinitum. This suggests that there is a natural limit to growth and that the slowdown might well be permanent. Gordon (2016) reached the same conclusion, arguing that we picked the “low–hanging fruit” (e.g., railroads, cars, and airplanes) during the “special century 1870–1970” and that more recent innovations pale in comparison. Bloom et al. (2016) provide evidence that supports this view.

In this paper, we investigate to which extent growth slowdown results from the interaction between unbalanced growth and structural transformation, which we refer to as unbalanced growth slowdown. To explain how unbalanced growth slowdown arises, let us go back to the observation of Baumol (1967) that modern economic growth has been unbalanced in that labor

1 Antolin-Diaz et al. (2016) (and several of the reference therein) offer statistical analyses of growth slowdown, confirming the same conclusion that we draw from eyeballing the graph.
productivity growth differed widely across industries. Baumol drew particular attention to the fact that many industries in the service sector experienced low labor productivity growth or even outright stagnation. More recently, Ngai and Pissarides (2007) observed that as economies develop resources are systematically reallocated towards the service industries. Taken to the extreme, their analysis implies that in the limit the service sector with the slowest productivity growth takes over the whole economy. Together, unbalanced growth and structural transformation therefore lead to unbalanced growth slowdown.

We begin our analysis by showing that unbalanced growth slowdown was quantitatively important for the productivity growth of the private U.S. economy after the second world war. We leave out the government sector because labor productivity of the government sector is not well measured. We use the broad disaggregation into goods (tangible value added) and services (intangible value added) that is common in the literature on structural transformation. Since the service sector comprises most of the U.S. economy and its industries have rather different labor productivity growth, we disaggregate it into services with fast growing productivity and services with slow growing productivity. Examples for the former are post/telecommunication and financial services and for the latter health and personal services.

To establish that unbalanced growth slowdown was quantitatively important in the postwar U.S. private economy, we use WORLD KLEMS data and the productivity accounting method of Nordhaus (2002). We measure the effect of unbalanced growth slowdown in two different ways. First, we compare the average annual growth rates of productivity during the twenty-year periods 1950–1970 and 1990–2010. We find that in the data the average annual growth rate of productivity fell by 1 percentage point and that unbalanced growth slowdown caused a quarter of that decline. Second, we focus on the average annual growth rate of productivity during the whole period. We find that if no structural transformation had taken place (that is, the sector composition had been fixed at the 1947 levels), then that growth rate would have been 0.37 percentage points higher than the 2.07% that it actually was. These findings establish that a sizeable part of the observed growth slowdown can be attributed to unbalanced growth slowdown. We also establish that most of the effects of unbalanced growth slowdown were due to structural transformation within the service sector, and that structural transformation within the service sector is likely to be all that matters for future unbalanced growth slowdown.

Although unbalanced growth slowdown is empirically important, the literature on structural transformation has all but ignored it. The likely reason for this is that analytically characterizing the equilibrium path of multi-sector models requires the existence of a generalized balanced growth path along which aggregate variables are either constant or grow at constant rates. Given that aggregate labor productivity grows at a constant rate along the generalized balanced growth path, unbalanced growth slowdown does not appear to be an issue. Our first contribution is to

---

2See Oulton (2001), Nordhaus (2008) and Baumol (2013) for more restatements of this observation.
3Herrendorf et al. (2014) review the literature on structural transformation.
clarify that this is a misconception. We develop a canonical model of structural transformation and show that it exhibits unbalanced growth slowdown in terms of welfare, in that the growth rate of welfare is declining of time. We then show that whether or not this is picked up by aggregate labor productivity growth depends critically on how one measures real quantities. Specifically, the model has a generalized balanced growth path along which aggregate labor productivity grows at a constant rate if one measures real quantities in “the usual model way”, which involves expressing the variables of a given period in units of a numeraire that period. In other words, the model way uses a different numeraire and different relative prices in each period. In contrast, “the NIPA way” of calculating real quantities uses fixed prices from a base period that do not change between two periods. We will show that this difference is critical: although our model displays balanced growth if real quantities are calculated in the model way, it displays unbalanced growth slowdown if real quantities are calculated in the NIPA way. Having clarified this, we restrict our model to generate the unbalanced growth slowdown of labor productivity in the postwar U.S. and use the restricted model to assess by how much unbalanced growth and structural transformation will slow down labor productivity growth in the next half century. To put the bottom line upfront, this will yield the surprising conclusion that unbalanced growth slowdown will be limited in the future. The reason for this conclusion is that, in contrast to the result that is usually derived in the literature, it will turn out that the sector with the slowest productivity growth won’t take over our entire model economy in the limit. This will restrain the future effect of unbalanced growth slowdown.

To guide which features to put into our canonical model of structural transformation, we document key stylized facts about unbalanced growth and structural transformation between goods and services and between services with slow and fast-growing productivity. The usual patterns hold between goods and total services: the shares of goods in total expenditure and total hours worked decline; the labor productivity of goods grows more strongly than that of total services; the price of goods relative to total services reflects this and declines. We then establish the following novel patterns about the two subsectors of the service sector: the shares of services with slow productivity growth in the hours and expenditures of total services increase until the 1970s after which they remain roughly constant; labor productivity of the services with fast–growing productivity grows over the whole period by less than that of goods and by more than that of services with slow productivity growth (which is by construction); labor productivity of services with slow–growing productivity grows somewhat until the 1970s and stagnates afterwards; the price of services with slow productivity growth relative to those with fast productivity growth reflects this: it initially increases until around 1970s and then it

4When we refer to the NIPA way of calculating real quantities, we mean calculating real quantities via chain indexes, which conforms to the best practice used by the BEA. A chain index is the geometric average of the Laspeyres index and the Paasche index, which are both fixed–weight indexes that use either the fixed prices of the initial period or the subsequent period. We emphasize that although it might sound similar, using chain indexes is completely different from using relative prices that change from period to period.
increases strongly. Together, these stylized facts imply that when the labor productivity of services with slow productivity growth starts to stagnate in the 1970s their shares stop increasing. This observation is crucial for what is to come, because it suggests that the services with slow productivity growth are not taking over the entire service sector.

Our canonical model has three sectors, which produce goods, services with fast productivity growth, and services with slow productivity growth. There is exogenous, sector–specific technological progress. Preferences are described by the non–homothetic CES utility function that has recently been proposed by Comin et al. (2015) in the context of structural transformation and that implies that income effects do not disappear in the limit when consumption grows without bound. This feature is consistent with the existing evidence [Boppart (2016) and Comin et al. (2015)], and it is potentially crucial in the present context because we are after the limit behavior of the economy. The novelty of our model compared to the literature on structural transformation is that we allow the elasticity of substitution between goods and total services to differ from the elasticity between fast and slow productivity growth services. To achieve this, we nest two non–homothetic CES utility functions: an outer layer aggregates goods and total services; an inner layer aggregates fast and slow productivity growth services into total services. This allows the model to do two things at the same time: keep the well established feature of preferences that goods and total services are complements, see for example Herrendorf et al. (2013); match the fact that the share of slow productivity growth services did not increase when their relative price increased strongly after 1970, for which fast and slow productivity growth services must be substitutes, instead of complements.

Assuming that the recent sectoral labor productivity growth continues into the future, our model implies that future unbalanced growth slowdown will be limited. The reason for this surprising finding is that in our model the services with slow productivity growth do not take over the entire economy. This comes about because the substitutability between services with fast and slow productivity growth puts a limit on how much future growth slowdown may occur in our model. If the relative price of service with slow productivity growth increases without bound, then households substitute the other services for them. This does not happen in existing models of structural transformation which impose a common elasticity of substitution among goods and all services, and which find that then goods and all services are complements.

Our work is related to several papers arguing that the service sector has become so large and heterogenous that it is useful to disaggregate it into subsectors; see for example Baumol et al. (1985), Jorgenson and Timmer (2011), and Duarte and Restuccia (2016). Our work is also related to several papers that measured cross–country gaps in sectoral TFP or labor productivity; see for example Duarte and Restuccia (2010), Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012) and Duarte and Restuccia (2016). Instead of focusing on cross–sections of countries, we focus on the evolution of U.S. labor productivity over time. The most closely related paper to ours is
Duarte and Restuccia (2016), which features in both sets of papers. Duarte and Restuccia use the 2005 cross section of the International Comparisons Program of the Penn World Table to estimate sectoral productivity gaps between rich and poor countries. They distinguish between traditional and modern services, which roughly corresponds to our distinction between services with slow and fast productivity growth. They find that the largest cross–country productivity gaps are in goods and modern services and the smallest cross–country gaps are in traditional services. This cross sectional evidence nicely complements our time series evidence from the U.S. If we took a rich and a poor country with that feature and looked at the productivity differences in a given sector, then our findings would imply that over time larger productivity differences between these countries emerge in goods and services with fast productivity growth than in services with slow productivity growth.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, we present evidence that structural transformation has led to growth slowdown in the postwar U.S. In Section 3, we develop our model. In the next section, we characterize under what conditions our model leads to unbalanced growth slowdown. In section 5, we calibrate our model and use it to predict how much future growth slowdown results from structural transformation. Section 6 concludes and an Appendix contains the detailed description of our data work, the proofs of our results, and additional evidence.

2 Evidence on Unbalanced Growth Slowdown in the Postwar U.S. Data

We use the data from WORLD KLEMS which offers information about both raw hours and adjusted hours that take into account differences in human capital (“efficiency hours”). Since we will study counterfactuals that reallocate workers with potentially different levels of human capital across sectors, having information about efficiency hours is important. We focus on the private U.S. economy. This implies that we leave out the one industry of the government sector, namely “public administration and defense; compulsory social security”, whose value added is hard to measure.

We split the private economy into the standard broad sectors goods and services. The goods sector comprises agriculture, construction, manufacturing, mining, and utilities and the service sector comprises the remaining industries. Baumol et al. (1985) observed that the service sector “contains some of the economy’s most progressive activities as well as its most stagnant”. Table 1 confirms this view for the 13 service industries of WORLD KLEMS. To capture the productivity differences among the service industries, we disaggregate services into two broad sub–sectors: services with fast and slow productivity growth. Table 1 lists the industries of each

---

5See Jorgenson et al. (2013) for a description of the data set.
Table 1: Average Annual Labor Productivity Growth in the U.S. Private Service Industries 1947–2010 ($\gamma_i$ and $\tilde{\gamma}_i$ indicate growth rates of labor productivity per hour and efficiency hour)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service industries with fast productivity growth</th>
<th>$\gamma_i$</th>
<th>$\tilde{\gamma}_i$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post and Telecommunications</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and Commission Trade, except Motor Vehicles/Cycles</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles/Cycles; Retail Sale of Fuel</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Trade, except Motor Vehicles/Cycles; Repair of Household Goods</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Intermediation</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Storage</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renting of Machinery &amp; Equipment and Other Business Activities</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service industries with slow productivity growth</th>
<th>$\gamma_i$</th>
<th>$\tilde{\gamma}_i$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Activities</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Households With Employed Persons</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Social Work</td>
<td>−0.1</td>
<td>−0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Community, Social and Personal Services</td>
<td>−0.5</td>
<td>−0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and Restaurants</td>
<td>−0.8</td>
<td>−1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of the two service subsectors together with their average productivity growth rates: in the services with fast productivity growth, the growth of value added per raw hour is at least 1.8% and in the services with slow productivity growth it is at most 1.1%. Below we will show that this two–sector split captures most of the unbalanced growth slowdown that resulted from structural transformation to the services industries and that other two–sector splits that have been used in the literature capture less of it.

2.1 Structural transformation in the data

Figure 2 shows the behavior of our sectors in the postwar U.S. economy. The left panel plots the standard distinction between goods and services while the right panel plots the new distinction between fast and slow growing services. The figures in the upper panel plot ratios of sectoral efficiency hours and sectoral nominal expenditures. The upper–left figure shows the usual pattern that the ratios of goods relative to aggregate services increased. The upper–right figure shows the novel pattern that the ratios of slow to fast growing services increased until the 1970s after which they remained roughly constant. The figures in the lower panel plot relative labor productivities and relative prices. The lower–left figure shows the usual pattern that the labor productivity of goods relative to services and the price of services relative to goods increased for most of the postwar period. The lower–right panel shows the novel pattern that both

---

6All figures in the text use raw hours worked. The patterns are qualitatively similar for raw hours and efficiency hours. The figures for efficiency hours can be found in Appendix D.
the labor productivity of service with fast relative to slow productivity growth and the price of services with slow relative to fast productivity growth increased somewhat until the 1970s and increased more strongly afterwards.

The slow productivity growth of many service industries may in part come from the fact that quality improvements in services are not properly measured. Triplett and Bosworth (2003), for example, wrote that “perhaps the services industries were never sick, it was just, as Griliches (1994) has suggested, that the measuring thermometer was wrong”. Mis-measured quality may translate into mis-measured aggregate productivity slowdown, although Byrne et al. (2016) and Syverson (2016) argued that this is not likely to be the case for the recent productivity slowdown since the early 2000s. We will take the numbers from WOLD KLEMS at face value in this paper and pretend that there were no mismeasured quality issues. Our estimates of unbalanced growth slowdown therefore provide an upper bound for the actual unbalanced growth slowdown; if there are unmeasured quality improvements in services, then future growth will be larger than our estimate and future growth slowdown will be smaller. This way of proceeding is informative in our context because our key finding will be that unbalanced growth slowdown will be limited in the future.
Table 2: Actual vs. Counterfactual Productivity Growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sector comp.</th>
<th>growth of value added per hour (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>actual</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counterfactual</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fixed at 1947</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fixed at 2010</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Two–Sector Splits (first column lists industries by decreasing productivity growth)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Fast Growth</th>
<th>Modern</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Low Skill</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Slow Growth</td>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>Non–Market</td>
<td>High Skill</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post and Telecom.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale ...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale ... of Motor Vehicles ...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail ...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial ...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport ...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... Business Services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate ...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health ...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Households ...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... Personal Services</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels ...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2 Unbalanced growth slowdown in the data

To assess whether unbalanced growth of sectoral labor productivity and structural transformation let to a quantitatively important growth slowdown, we compare the actual growth rates of real value added per hour with two counterfactual growth rates. The first would have resulted from the observed average sector growth rates if the sectoral composition of 1947 had prevailed over the entire period. The second would have resulted if the sectoral composition of 2010 had prevailed over the entire period. Calculating the counterfactuals is not as straightforward as one might think because WORLD KLEMS is build around Törnqvist indexes that are not additive.\(^7\)

To deal with this complication, we use the productivity accounting method of Nordhaus (2002); see Appendix A for the details.

\(^7\)Törnqvist and Chain Indexes are both flexible weight indexes. For the data work, they two gives very similar results.
A first pass at establishing that unbalanced growth slowdown was quantitatively important is to compare the total growth slowdown between 1950 and 2010 with the unbalanced growth slowdown that can be attributed to structural transformation. Again focusing on 20–year averages, the annual growth rates of labor productivity per raw hour fell by 1 percentage point from 2.77% during 1950–1970 to 1.77% during 1990–2010. If the sector composition had been fixed at the 1947 values, then they would have fallen by 0.75 percentage points from 2.94% to 2.19%. These numbers suggest that unbalanced growth slowdown accounts for a quarter of the total growth slowdown.

Looking now at different levels of disaggregation, Table 2 reports the growth slowdown of productivity per raw hour for the 30 sector industry split of the raw data, for the 13 industry split of services in the data, and for several two–sector splits of services. Table 2 has several important implications. First, as established in the previous paragraph, structural transformation among the 30 industries of WORLD KLEMS had a sizeable effect on aggregate productivity growth: if the sector composition had been fixed at the 1947 (2010) values, then average annual aggregate productivity growth would have been 2.44 (1.72) percent instead of the actual 2.07 percent. Most of these sizeable effects of unbalanced growth slowdown are due to the structural transformation within the 13 service industries: if the sector composition within the service sector had been fixed at the 1947 (2010) values, then average annual aggregate productivity growth would have been 2.29 (1.72) percent instead of the actual 2.07 percent.

Interestingly, the counterfactual growth rate for the fixed sector composition from 2010 is the same for the 30 industries and the 13 service industries. This implies that with the 2010 sector composition the effects of unbalanced growth slowdown arise mostly from reallocation within the service industries, which is not surprising because the service sector comprises most of the economy in 2010. Since we are interested in the future effects of unbalanced growth slowdown, we interpret this result to imply that we can focus our analysis on the reallocation within the service sector. That leaves the question whether we need to work with the 13 service industries or whether a more aggregated split captures the essence of past unbalanced growth slowdown. We consider four two–sector splits: services with fast productivity growth vs. slow productivity growth and three alternatives that have been considered in the literature: modern vs. traditional services as suggested by Duarte and Restuccia (2016); market vs. non–market services as suggested by the guidelines of the System of National Accounts; skilled vs. unskilled as suggested by Buera et al. (2015). Table 3 lists which industries belong to these splits. Table 2 shows that our two–sector split provides the best approximation, and that approximation gets very close to the unbalanced growth slowdown with the 13 service industries. We conclude from this that our two–sector split captures the essence of unbalanced growth slowdown within the service sector.

Two remarks are at order at this point. First, modern vs. traditional services, which was
suggested by Duarte and Restuccia (2016), captures almost as much of unbalanced growth slowdown as our two–sector split. This is not a surprise given that the industry assignments are nearly identical in the two splits. What is somewhat of a surprise is that the industry assignments of the two splits end up so similar although the methods used to obtain them are rather different. Duarte and Restuccia (2016) were interested in cross country productivity differences, and so they worked with final expenditure data and grouped service expenditure categories according to how their relative prices behaved. Instead, we are interested in the U.S. time series for productivity, and so we work with data on value added and group service industries according to how their productivities behaves. Second, while we have so far reported results for value added per hour, WORLD KLEMS also reports efficiency hours that take into account human capital differences across industries. Table 1 shows that the productivity ranking of the 13 service industries is the same for raw hours and for efficiency hours. Table 4 shows that the absolute size of the unbalanced growth slowdown is similar for raw hours and efficiency hours. We conclude from this that it is acceptable in the current context to focus on productivity per raw hour, which has the advantage of being simpler and of making our results easily comparable with those of existing studies. The disadvantage of focusing on productivity per raw hour is that it implicitly assumes that if a worker is reallocated to another sector then his productivity equals the average productivity of the other sector irrespective of what his initial human capital was, which is a bit of a stretch.

Given that we used the productivity accounting method of Nordhaus, it is natural to compare our results with his. Nordhaus (2008) finds if the sector composition had not changed, then the annual average growth rate would have been 0.37 percentage points higher; the average growth rate with the fixed initial sector composition is 0.64 percentage points larger than the average growth rate with the fixed final sector composition. While it is reassuring that his numbers are in the same range as our numbers, there are several important differences between the two studies that imply that one should not expect the numbers to be the same. To begin with, whereas we focus on 1948–2010 and use WORLD KLEMS data, Nordhaus focuses on the shorter time period 1948–2001 and uses BEA data. Moreover, whereas we calculate the growth rates of labor productivity, he calculated the growth rates of total factor productivity. Lastly, whereas we report the combined productivity effects from reallocating labor among industries with different growth rates of sectoral productivity ("Baumol Effect") and different levels of sectoral productivity ("Denison Effect"), Nordhaus separates the two effects and so his numbers quoted above refer to the Baumol Effect only.

After having established that structural transformation led to an economically significant unbalanced growth slowdown, we now build a model to capture this. Afterwards, we will calibrate the model and use it to assess by how much unbalanced sectoral productivity growth and structural transformation will reduce future productivity growth.
Table 4: Value Added per Hour vs. Efficiency Hour for 13 Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sector composition</th>
<th>growth of value added (in %) per hour</th>
<th>growth of value added (in %) per efficiency hour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>actual</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counterfactual fixed at 1947</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counterfactual fixed at 2010</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Model

3.1 Environment

There are three sectors called goods, services with fast productivity growth, and services with slow productivity growth. For brevity, we will also refer to the two service sectors as sector 1 and 2. In each sector, value added is produced from labor:

\[ Y_i = A_i H_i \] (1)

\( i = g, 1, 2 \) is the sector index and \( Y_i, A_i, \) and \( H_i \) denote value added, total factor productivity, and labor of sector \( i \). The linear functional form implies that labor productivity equals TFP, that is, \( Y_i / H_i = A_i \). We use it because it is simple and captures the essence of the role that technological progress plays for structural transformation; see Herrendorf et al. (2015) for further discussion.

There is a measure one of identical households. Each household is endowed with one unit of labor that is inelastically supplied and can be used in all sectors. As a result, GDP and GDP per capita, GDP per worker, and GDP per hour are all equal in our model. GDP per hour is also referred to as labor productivity or productivity for short.

Utility is described by two nested, non–homothetic CES utility functions. The utility from the consumption of goods and (aggregate) services, \( C_g \) and \( C_{st} \), is given by:

\[
C_t = \left( \alpha^g C^\sigma C^\sigma_g + \alpha^s C^\sigma C^\sigma_s \right)^{\sigma^{-1}}
\] (2a)

Services are given by a non–homothetic CES aggregator of the consumption from the two service sub–sectors, \( C_{1t} \) and \( C_{2t} \):

\[
C_{st} = \left( \alpha^1 C^\sigma C_{1t}^\sigma + \alpha^2 C^\sigma C_{2t}^\sigma \right)^{\sigma^{-1}}
\] (2b)
\(\alpha_g, \alpha_s, \alpha_1, \alpha_2 \geq 0\) are weights; \(\sigma_c, \sigma_s \geq 0\) are elasticities of substitution; \(\varepsilon_g, \varepsilon_s, \varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2 > 0\) capture income effects. We follow Comin et al. (2015) and assume that in each aggregator one good is a luxury good whereas the other one is a necessity. A sufficient condition is:

**Assumption 1**

- \(\min\{\varepsilon_g, \varepsilon_s\} \leq 1 \leq \max\{\varepsilon_g, \varepsilon_s\}\).

- \(\min\{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2\} \leq 1 \leq \max\{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2\}\).

The non–homothetic CES utility function (2) goes back to the work of Hanoch (1975) and Sato (1975) on implicitly additive utility and production functions. It has recently been used in the context of structural transformation by Comin et al. (2015) and by Sposi (2016). For \(\varepsilon_i = 1\) it reduces to the standard CES utility that implies homothetic demand functions for each consumption good. For \(\varepsilon_i \neq 1\), the level of consumption affects the relative weight that is attached to the consumption goods. Although in this case there is no closed–form solution for utility as a function of the consumption goods, it turns out that the implied non–homothetic demand functions remain tractable. Moreover, the income effects that are implied by the non–homothetic demand functions do not disappear in the limit as consumption grows without bound. Boppart (2016) and Comin et al. (2015) established that this is consistent with the available evidence for the broad sectors that are usually considered in the structural transformation literature. Figure 3 establishes that this is also consistent with the evidence for the two service sectors that we consider here. Specifically, the figure establishes that the partial correlation between the relative value added within services and the aggregate value added per hour is well approximated by a straight line, which implies that the income effects on the relative demand of the two service sectors does not systematically decline as the economy grows. Modelling these long–run income effects is important here because we are interested in the limit behavior of the economy. A standard Stone–Geary utility specification would not capture long–run income effects because, as consumption grows without bound, it converges to a homothetic utility function.\(^8\)

The non–homothetic CES aggregators make economic sense only if they are monotonically increasing in each of the arguments. To ensure that this is the case, we restrict the parameters as follows:

**Assumption 2**

- \(\sigma_c < \min\{\varepsilon_g, \varepsilon_s\} \ or \ \max\{\varepsilon_g, \varepsilon_s\} < \sigma_c\).

\(^8\)We should mention that a disadvantage of the functional form (2) is that it is not aggregable in the Gorman sense; if there is a distribution of households with different consumption expenditure instead of a continuum of measure one of identical households, then it is not obvious how to derive the aggregate demand for the different consumption goods from the decisions of a representative household. While that is not a crucial limitation for our application with a representative household, it is likely to be an issue in environments with a non–degenerate cross section of households.
Figure 3: Long-run Income Effects within Services

Partial correlation between relative value added within services and aggregate value added per hour

Note: Residuals on the y-axis are from regressing the log difference of nominal value added of services with slow and fast productivity growth on the corresponding log difference of prices. Residuals on the x-axis are from regressing the log of aggregate real value added per hour on the same log differences of prices.

\[ \sigma_s < \min\{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2\} \text{ or } \max\{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2\} < \sigma_s. \]

Appendix B proves that these restrictions have the desired effect:

**Lemma 1** Assumption 2 is necessary and sufficient for

\[
\frac{\partial C_i(C_{gt}, C_{st})}{\partial C_{it}} > 0 \quad \forall i \in \{g, s\} \quad \forall C_{gt}, C_{st} \geq 0
\]

\[
\frac{\partial C_{st}(C_{1t}, C_{2t})}{\partial C_{jt}} > 0 \quad \forall j \in \{1, 2\} \quad \forall C_{1t}, C_{2t} \geq 0
\]

We complete the description of the environment with the resource constraints:

\[
C_{it} \leq Y_{it}, \quad i = g, 1, 2 \quad (3a)
\]

\[
H_t = H_{gt} + H_{st} = H_{gt} + H_{1t} + H_{2t} \leq 1 \quad (3b)
\]

### 3.2 Competitive equilibrium

In the competitive equilibrium of many multi-sector models, the nominal labor productivities per hour (“nominal labor productivity”) are equalized across sectors. There are many possible reasons for this, for example, differences in the average level of human capital across sectors. Although we don’t model these reasons here, we capture the resulting level differences in productivity. This is important in our context, because the effects of structural transformation on aggregate productivity depend on the differences in both the growth rates and the levels of sectoral productivity (“Baumol Effect” and “Denisson Effect”).
We introduce a sector-specific tax, $\tau_{it}$, that firms have to pay per unit of wage payments and that are lump-sum rebated through a transfer $T_t = \sum_{i=g,1,2} \tau_{it} w_i H_{it}$ to households. The recent development literature on misallocation would interpret this tax as a reduced-form way of capturing distortions to employment. But it could also capture the effects of level differences in human capital across sectors. All that matters for our purposes is that it will allow us to capture level differences in sectoral productivity.

The problem of firm $i = g, 1, 2$ now is:

$$\max_{H_{it}} P_{it} A_{it} H_{it} - (1 + \tau_{it}) w_i H_{it}$$

The first-order condition implies that

$$\frac{P_{jt}}{P_{gt}} = \frac{(1 + \tau_{jt}) A_{gt}}{(1 + \tau_{gt}) A_{jt}}, \quad j = 1, 2 \quad (4)$$

Using this and the production function, (1), we obtain that the relative sectoral labor productivities equal the relative taxes:

$$\frac{P_{jt} C_{jt}}{H_{jt}} / \frac{P_{gt} C_{gt}}{H_{gt}} = \frac{1 + \tau_{jt}}{1 + \tau_{gt}}, \quad j = 1, 2 \quad (5)$$

As intended, the taxes drive a wedge between the expenditure ratio and the hours ratio. As a result, our model captures that the nominal sectoral labor productivities are different.

It is also crucial to capture that labor productivity growth is strongest in the goods sector and weakest in service sector with slow productivity growth. To ensure tractability, we assume for the analytical part that sectoral taxes and sectoral labor productivity growth are constant. Moreover, we assume:

**Assumption 3** Taxes are constant. Technological progress is constant and uneven across sectors: $\hat{A}_{jt} = \gamma_j$ where $j \in \{g, 1, 2\}$ and

$$\hat{A}_{jt} \equiv \frac{A_{jt}}{A_{j(t-1)}}$$

denote growth factors and $\gamma_j$ are constants with $1 < \gamma_2 < \gamma_1 < \gamma_g$.

Note that equation (4) and the assumption that taxes are constant imply that

$$\left(\frac{P_{jt}}{P_{it}}\right)^{\gamma_i} = \frac{\gamma_i}{\gamma_j}, \quad i, j \in \{g, 1, 2\} \quad (6)$$

To solve the household problem, we split it in two layers. The “inner layer” is to allocate a
given quantity of service consumption between the consumption of the two services:

\[
\min_{C_{1t}, C_{2t}} P_{1t} C_{1t} + P_{2t} C_{2t} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \left( \frac{\frac{1}{\alpha_1} \sigma_{g1}^{\sigma_{11}} C_{1t}^{\sigma_{11}} - \frac{1}{\alpha_2} \sigma_{g2}^{\sigma_{21}} C_{2t}^{\sigma_{21}}}{\frac{1}{\alpha_1} \sigma_{g1}^{\sigma_{11}} C_{1t}^{\sigma_{11}} + \frac{1}{\alpha_2} \sigma_{g2}^{\sigma_{21}} C_{2t}^{\sigma_{21}}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma_e}{\sigma_e - 1}} \geq C_{st}
\]

Appendix B shows that the first–order conditions imply that

\[
\frac{P_{2t} C_{2t}}{P_{1t} C_{1t}} = \frac{\alpha_2}{\alpha_1} \left( \frac{P_{2t}}{P_{1t}} \right)^{1-\sigma_e} \quad (7a)
\]

\[
P_{st} = \left( \alpha_1 C_t^{\sigma_{g1}^{\sigma_{11}} - \sigma_e} + \alpha_2 C_t^{\sigma_{g2}^{\sigma_{21}} - 1} \right)^{1-\sigma_e} \quad (7b)
\]

where \( P_{st} \) is price index of services. The “outer layer” is to allocate a given quantity of total consumption between the consumption of goods and services:

\[
\min_{C_{g1}, C_{s1}, C_{g2}, C_{s2}} P_{g1} C_{g1} + P_{s1} C_{s1} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \left( \frac{\frac{1}{\alpha_g} \sigma_{g1}^{\sigma_{g1}^{\sigma_{11}}} C_{g1}^{\sigma_{g1}^{\sigma_{11}}} - \frac{1}{\alpha_s} \sigma_{s1}^{\sigma_{s1}^{\sigma_{11}}} C_{s1}^{\sigma_{s1}^{\sigma_{11}}}}{\frac{1}{\alpha_g} \sigma_{g1}^{\sigma_{g1}^{\sigma_{11}}} C_{g1}^{\sigma_{g1}^{\sigma_{11}}} + \frac{1}{\alpha_s} \sigma_{s1}^{\sigma_{s1}^{\sigma_{11}}} C_{s1}^{\sigma_{s1}^{\sigma_{11}}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma_e}{\sigma_e - 1}} \geq C_t
\]

Appendix B shows that the first–order conditions imply

\[
\frac{P_{s1} C_{s1}}{P_{g1} C_{g1}} = \frac{\alpha_s}{\alpha_g} \left( \frac{P_{s1}}{P_{g1}} \right)^{1-\sigma_e} \quad (8a)
\]

\[
P_{t} = \left( \alpha_g C_t^{\sigma_{g1}^{\sigma_{11}} - \sigma_e} + \alpha_s C_t^{\sigma_{s1}^{\sigma_{11}} - 1} \right)^{1-\sigma_e} \quad (8b)
\]

\[
P_{t} C_{t} = \left( \alpha_g C_t^{\sigma_{g1}^{\sigma_{11}} - \sigma_e} P_{g1}^{1-\sigma_e} + \alpha_s C_t^{\sigma_{s1}^{\sigma_{11}} - \sigma_e} P_{st}^{1-\sigma_e} \right)^{1-\sigma_e} \quad (8c)
\]

where \( P_{t} \) is the aggregate price index and \( P_{t} C_{t} = \sum_{i=g,1,2} P_{i} C_{it} \).

## 4 Unbalanced Growth Slowdown in the Model

We are now ready to study how unbalanced growth slowdown arises in our model. We will proceed in two steps. We will first identify parameter restrictions under which our model gives rise to the stylized facts of structural transformation and then study unbalanced growth slowdown in two special cases in which we can obtain analytical solutions.

---

9The given quantity of total consumption is determined by the endowment of labor and the technology: \( C_t = A_{g1}/P_t \). This is shown in the proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix B. A particular household takes \( A_{g1}/P_t \) as given because \( A_{g1} \) is exogenous and \( P_t \) is the aggregate price index that is independent of its actions.
4.1 Structural transformation

We begin with the structural transformation between goods and services. Dividing (8a) for periods $t+1$ and $t$ by each other, we obtain:

$$\left(\frac{P_{st}C_{st}}{P_{gt}C_{gt}}\right) = \left(\frac{P_{st}}{P_{gt}}\right)^{1-\sigma_c} \widehat{C_t}^{\varepsilon_s-\varepsilon_g}$$

(9)

The first term on the right–hand side is the relative price effect and the second term is the income effect. We make the standard assumption that goods and aggregate services are complements, goods are necessities, and services are luxuries:10

**Assumption 4** $0 < \sigma_c < 1$ and $\varepsilon_g < 1 < \varepsilon_s$.

Expression (9) shows that our model then generates the observed structural transformation from goods to services if $P_{st}/P_{gt}$ and $C_t$ both grow. We will impose additional restrictions below that make sure that this is the case.

![Figure 4: Relative Prices and Expenditures in Services](image)

We continue with the structural transformation between the two service subsectors. Combining Equations (5), (6) and (7a), we obtain:

$$\left(\frac{P_{2t}C_{2t}}{P_{1t}C_{1t}}\right) = \left(\frac{\gamma_1}{\gamma_2}\right)^{1-\sigma_s} \widehat{C_t}^{\varepsilon_2-\varepsilon_1}$$

(10)

We assume that the two service subsectors are substitutes, services with fast productivity growth are a necessity, and services with slow productivity growth are a luxury:

10See Kongsamut et al. (2001), Ngai and Pissarides (2007), and Herrendorf et al. (2013) for justifications of these assumptions.
Assumption 5 \( 1 < \sigma_s \) and \( \varepsilon_1 < 1 < \varepsilon_2 \).

Assumption 5 implies that the relative price effect, which is the first term on the right-hand side of Equation (10), decreases the expenditure ratio of services with fast productivity growth to services with slow productivity growth. The income effect, which is the second term on the right-hand side, increases the expenditure ratio of services with slow productivity growth relative to services with fast productivity growth if \( C_t \) increases. Combining these effects, our model can replicate the patterns of structural transformation within the service sector as summarized by Figure 4. Until around 1970 the price of services with slow productivity growth relative to services with fast productivity growth increased along with the corresponding expenditure ratio. Our model replicates this pattern if the income effect dominates the relative price effect before 1970. For this to happen, services with slow productivity growth must be luxuries. After 1970, the increase in the relative price of services with slow productivity growth accelerated while the expenditure ratio remained roughly constant. Our model replicates this pattern if the income effect offsets the relative price effect after 1970. For this to happen, the two service subcategories must be substitutes and the acceleration in the relative price increase after 1970 must sufficiently strengthen the price effect.

Alternative parameter constellations would not be able to generate the observed patterns. To see this, note first that the income effects do not change in 1970 but work in the same directions during the whole period. So the change in the relative expenditure share pattern must be coming from the acceleration in the relative prices. If the services were complements, then the expenditure of services with slow productivity growth would have increased by more after 1970 than before 1970, which is counterfactual. Given that the two services must be substitutes, services with slow productivity growth must be a luxury and services with fast productivity growth must be a necessity. If the opposite was true, then the expenditure of service with fast productivity growth relative to services with slow productivity growth would have increased during the whole period, which again is counterfactual.

We are left with the task of ensuring that \( C_t \) and \( P_{st}/P_{gt} \) both grow, which we have assumed but not proved so far. We need to impose further restrictions on the parameters to show this. First, the elasticity of consumption expenditures with respect to real consumption is non-negative. Appendix B shows that a sufficient condition is:

**Assumption 6**

\[
\frac{\varepsilon_s - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_c} < \frac{\varepsilon_2 - 1}{1 - \sigma_s} + \frac{\varepsilon_s - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_c} \tag{11}
\]

We can now ensure that the growth of aggregate consumption is positive and finite:

**Lemma 2** If Assumptions 1–6 hold, then the growth of aggregate consumption is bounded from
below and above: $1 < \mathcal{C} \leq \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_t \leq \bar{\mathcal{C}}$ where

$$\mathcal{C} \equiv \gamma_2 \frac{(1-\sigma_c)(1-\sigma_s)}{1-\sigma_c}$$ \hspace{1cm} (12a)

$$\bar{\mathcal{C}} \equiv \gamma_{g-\sigma_c}$$ \hspace{1cm} (12b)

Lastly, we need to ensure that the price of aggregate services relative to goods increases. We need two additional assumptions:

**Assumption 7** The growth factors of sector labor productivity satisfy:

$$\gamma_1 < \gamma_2 \frac{(1-\sigma_c)(\varepsilon_1-\varepsilon_2)}{\varepsilon_1(1-\sigma_c)+\varepsilon_2(1-\sigma_c)}$$ \hspace{1cm} (13a)

$$\gamma_2 < \gamma_{g-\sigma_c} \frac{(1-\sigma_c)(\varepsilon_2-1)}{\varepsilon_2(1-\sigma_c)}$$ \hspace{1cm} (13b)

Note that a sufficient condition for (13b) to be satisfied is that

$$\frac{\varepsilon_2-1}{\sigma_s-1} < \frac{\varepsilon_g-\sigma_c}{1-\sigma_c}$$ \hspace{1cm} (14)

**Lemma 3** Suppose that Assumptions 1–7 hold. Then the price of services relative to goods increases over time, $\tilde{P}_{st} > 1$.

We conclude this subsection by summarising the patterns of structural transformation in our model. We start with goods and services:

**Proposition 1** If Assumptions 1–7 hold, then along the equilibrium path the expenditure and employment shares of the goods sector are monotonically decreasing and converge to zero as time goes to infinity.

In other words, our model generates the standard pattern of the structural transformation between goods and services that is familiar from many two–sector models of structural transformation: the goods sector shrinks and eventually the service sector takes over the model economy.

Regarding the structural transformation within the service sector, Lemma 2 and Equation (10) immediately imply:
Proposition 2 If Assumptions 1–7 hold, then along the equilibrium path

\[
\gamma_1 < \gamma_2 \implies \frac{P_2 C_2}{P_1 C_1} > 1 \quad (15a)
\]

\[
\gamma_1 > \gamma_2 \implies \frac{P_2 C_2}{P_1 C_1} < 1 \quad (15b)
\]

In other words, if the productivity growth in the two service sectors is “sufficiently close”, then the income effect will dominate and services with slow productivity growth take over in the limit. In contrast, if productivity in the two service sectors is “sufficiently different”, then the price effect will dominate and services with fast productivity growth will take over in the limit. The fact that both cases are possible in the limit suggest that there is a third knife-edge case in which the two forces exactly offset each other and the shares of the two service subsectors remain constant. Which of the three cases prevails in the long run for plausible parameter values is a quantitative question which we will answer below by simulating a calibrated version of our model.

4.2 Growth slowdown

After having established that our model can qualitatively generate the patterns of structural transformation that we observe in the data, we now turn to the question whether it generates growth slowdown along the equilibrium path. We start by exploring what we can say about balanced growth of welfare in our model. Given that we have a continuum of measure one of identical households, the natural welfare measure is \( C_t \). Appendix B shows that:

Proposition 3 If Assumptions 1–7 hold, then the growth factor of welfare, \( \tilde{C}_t \), decreases along the equilibrium path.

In other words, our model generates an unbalanced growth slowdown in terms of welfare. This should not come as a surprise given that the interaction of preferences and uneven technological progress reallocates labor from the faster growing goods sector to the slower growing service sectors. In practice, researchers use GDP per capita as a proxy for welfare because GDP per capita is so widely available over time and across countries. Note that the way in which we have set up our model implies that GDP per capita equals labor productivity, so we will use the two concepts interchangeably in what follows.

We now answer the obvious question whether standard measures of GDP per capita capture the unbalanced growth slowdown in welfare. The answer is more nuanced than one might initially think. We will show that it depends critically on which measure of GDP per capita is used and on what the relative sizes of the taxes are. We will derive analytical results in two special cases, which serve as useful benchmarks to sharpen our intuition: the growth factors are
constant but uneven across sectors and taxes are zero ("uneven technological progress and zero taxes"); the growth factors are the same in all sectors and taxes are constant but uneven across sectors ("even technological progress and unequal taxes"). We will deal with the general case ("uneven technological progress and non–zero taxes") in the subsequent quantitative section.

4.2.1 Uneven technological progress and zero taxes

If taxes are zero, it turns out that whether or not our model leads to unbalanced growth slowdown in terms of GDP per capita depends on the way in which GDP capita is calculated. There are two possibilities. The literature on multi–sector models chooses the units of a current–period numeraire $j \in \{g, 1, 2\}$:

$$\hat{Y}^{n j}_t \equiv \frac{\sum_{i=g,1,2} P_{it} C_{it}}{\sum_{i=g,1,2} P_{it}^{-1} C_{it}^{-1}}$$

This means that the numeraire differs between two adjacent periods: in period $t$ it is $C_j$ whereas in $t–1$ it is $C_{j–1}$. In contrast, NIPA statisticians calculate GDP per capita by using chain indexes, that is, the geometrically weighted average of the Laspeyres and the Paasche quantity indexes.

$$\hat{Y}^{ch}_t = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=g,1,2} P_{it}^{-1} C_{it}}{\sum_{i=g,1,2} P_{it}^{-1} C_{it}^{-1}} \cdot \frac{\sum_{i=g,1,2} P_{it} C_{it}}{\sum_{i=g,1,2} P_{it} C_{it}^{-1}}}$$

Note that it does not matter whether one calculates GDP from a chained quantity index like the one above or from nominal GDP and a chained price index. This is shown in the next lemma, which is proven again in Appendix B.

**Lemma 4** Chained quantity and price indexes satisfy:

$$\hat{Y}^{ch}_t \times \hat{P}^{ch}_t = \hat{P}_t \hat{Y}_t$$

We start with characterizing the growth of GDP per capita when we use a current–period numeraire. Appendix B shows that:

**Proposition 4** Suppose that $\tau_{it} = \tau_t$ for $i = g, 1, 2$ and that we use a current–period numeraire $j = g, 1, 2$ to calculate real GDP. If Assumptions 1–3 hold, then the growth factor of real GDP per capita is constant: $\hat{Y}^{n j}_t = \gamma_j$.

---

11Note that technically it is enough if taxes are the same in all sectors. But there is no important difference in our context between all taxes being equal to zero and all taxes being the same.
The fact that the growth of real GDP per capita in units of a current–period numeraire is constant greatly simplifies the characterization of the equilibrium path, because it can be calculated as a balanced growth path. This is particularly helpful in model versions with capital. The disadvantage is that the growth factor of real GDP per capita depends on the choice of the numeraire, which is sometimes called the Gerschenkron Effect. In addition, constant growth of real GDP per capita is in sharp contrast to the unbalanced growth slowdown of welfare.

Chain indexes avoid the Gerschenkron Effect and have the additional advantage that the growth rate of real GDP per capita is independent of the base year. In addition, it turns out that they can capture the unbalanced growth slowdown in terms of welfare:¹²

**Proposition 5** Suppose that \( \tau_{it} = \tau_i \) for \( i = g, 1, 2 \) and that we use the chain index to calculate real GDP, then the equilibrium growth of real GDP per capita

- changes with the sectoral composition of the economy ("unbalanced growth");
- slows over time if \( \tilde{H}_{2t} \geq 0 \).

Proposition 4 provides a sufficient condition under which our model generates growth slowdown in terms of GDP per capita: the forces of structural transformation have to play out in such a way that labor is reallocated to the service sector with the low productivity growth, \( \tilde{H}_2 \geq 0 \). To develop intuition for this condition we proceed in two steps. First, fix the allocation of aggregate services between the two services. The reallocation from goods to aggregate service then slows down aggregate productivity growth, because productivity growth is larger in the goods sector than in the service subsector. This is an example of what Nordhaus (2002, 2008) called the “Baumol Effect”. Consider now the additional reallocation within aggregate services. Reallocation towards the services with fast productivity growth increases the productivity growth of aggregate services. For growth slowdown to happen, this effect must not be too strong. A sufficient condition for this is that this reallocation is absent, which is the case if the hours share of the services with fast productivity growth does not decline.

In sum, whether or not our model exhibits unbalanced growth slowdown in terms of GDP per capita depends critically on which of the two methods we use to calculate GDP. This is not at all appreciated in the literature on multi–sector models, which tends to connect growth rates from the model economy which are calculated with current–period numeraires to growth rates from the data which are calculated with chain indexes. Since the growth properties of GDP are dramatically different under the two methods, proceeding in this way can be very misleading.¹³

---

¹²The proof again is in Appendix B.

¹³Some readers might have noticed that in our empirical analysis we use aggregate growth rates from the WORLD KLEMS dataset, which are based on the Törnqvist index, whereas in our theoretical analysis we consider the aggregate growth rates calculated by the chain–weighted index (a Fischer index). Although both indexes are conceptually different, they are equal to a second–order approximation. In applied work, they are therefore typically used interchangeably.
4.2.2 Even technological progress and unequal taxes

We now turn to the second case in which we can derive analytical results: the growth factors are the same in all sectors but the sectoral taxes differ. This case captures the feature of reality that the levels of sectoral labor productivity differ. Appendix B show that

**Proposition 6** If Assumptions 1–7 hold and that \( \gamma \equiv \gamma_i, i = g, 1, 2 \). The growth factor of real GDP per capita is not constant in general:

\[
\hat{Y}_{jt}^{mj} = \hat{Y}_{jt}^{ch} = \gamma \frac{\sum_{i=g,1,2}(1 + \tau_i)H_{it}}{\sum_{i=g,1,2}(1 + \tau_i)H_{it-1}}
\]  

(16)

The proposition shows that even if labor productivity growth is the same in all sectors, the growth factor of real GDP per capita will in general not be equal to that rate. This comes about because the tax differences introduce a wedge between the nominal labor productivities of the different sectors; compare (5). Structural transformation then leads to an acceleration (slow down) of the growth of GDP per capita if labor is reallocated towards the sectors with higher (lower) levels of labor productivity. Figure 5 shows that in the data

\[
\frac{P_{2t}C_{2t}}{H_{2t}} \geq \frac{P_{gt}C_{gt}}{H_{gt}}
\]  

\[
\frac{P_{1t}C_{1t}}{H_{1t}} \leq \frac{P_{gt}C_{gt}}{H_{gt}}
\]

Normalizing \( \tau_g = 0 \), this implies that \( \tau_2 > 0 \) and \( \tau_1 < 0 \) and that the reallocation to the second type of services increases GDP growth whereas the reallocation to first type of services decreases the growth of real GDP per capita. Nordhaus (2002,2008) called this the “Denison Effect”.

5 Calibration and Predictions

In this section, we calibrate our model to match key features of the postwar U.S. economy, such as the sectoral growth rates and the reallocation across sectors. We then use the calibrated model to study how large unbalanced growth slowdown will be in the future.

5.1 Calibration

We start with the calibration of the sectoral taxes and TFPs. Since only relative taxes matter for the equilibrium, we normalize the taxes in the goods sector to zero, \( \tau_{gt} = 0 \). Defining nominal
value added as $VA_{jt} \equiv P_{jt}C_{jt} = P_{jt}A_{jt}H_{jt}$, (4)–(5) give

$$1 + \tau_{jt} = \frac{VA_{jt}/H_{jt}}{VA_{gt}/H_{gt}}, \quad j = 1, 2$$

We measure $\{(VA_{jt}/H_{jt})/(VA_{gt}/H_{gt})\}$ for $j = 1, 2$ and $t = 1947, ..., 2010$ from the data and use this relationship to obtain the values for $[\tau_{jt}]$. Next, we set $P_{g,1947} = P_{1,1947} = P_{2,1947} = A_{g,1947} = 1$ and back out the implied $A_{j,1947}$. Lastly, we take $\{P_{it}\}$ for $i = g, 1, 2$ and $t = 1947, ..., 2010$ from the data and calibrate $\{A_{jt}\}$ so as to match the observed changes in real labor productivity, $\{(VA_{jt}/(P_{jt}H_{jt}))/(VA_{gt}/(P_{gt}H_{gt}))\}$, in the data. Figure 6 shows the calibrated taxes and TFPs.

We jointly calibrate the remaining ten parameters ($\alpha_g, \alpha_s, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \sigma_s, \sigma_c, \epsilon_g, \epsilon_s, \epsilon_1, \epsilon_2$). The
first targets are the relative nominal value added of the different sectors:

\[
\left\{ \begin{array}{l}
P \beta C_j \\
\bar{P}_j C_j^t
\end{array} \right\}_{t=1947, \ldots, 2010}, \quad j = 1, 2
\]  

(17)

These targets allow us to identify all parameters except for two of the four \( \varepsilon_i \). This is a well known issue with Hanoch’s non–homothetic CES utility function. It did not constitute a problem for Comin et al. (2015) because they were interested in estimating the implied demand functions. Since they depend only on \( \varepsilon_1 - \varepsilon_2 \) and \( \varepsilon_2 - \varepsilon_1 \), they could take prices and consumption expenditure from the data without identifying all four \( \varepsilon_i \). In contrast, we want to simulate the full–blown general equilibrium path, and so we need the prices and consumption expenditure that the model generates. Generating them requires the values of all four \( \varepsilon_i \).

To obtain additional targets, we use the fact that the values of \( \varepsilon_i \) affect how changes in \( C_t \) translate into changes in \( (P_{st}, C_{st}, P_t) \). We stress that it is not appropriate to compare the model–implied \( (P_{st}, C_{st}, P_t, C_t) \) directly with the corresponding statistics from the data, because the model aggregates are based on non–homothetic CES aggregators whereas WORLD KLEMS aggregates are based on Thörnqvist indexes. Although locally the two are equal to a second–order approximation, over time they may grow apart. Hence, the model statistics and the data statistics with the same names are really different objects, and it does not make conceptual sense to require them to be close. To find a calibration strategy that makes conceptual sense, we apply the model’s non–homothetic CES aggregator to raw quantities from the model and from the data and compare the resulting aggregates. In particular, we first calculate the \( \{\bar{P}_{st}, \bar{C}_{st}, \bar{P}_t, \bar{C}_t\} \) that are implied by the data values of \( \{C_{st}(D), C_{1t}(D), C_{2t}(D)\} \) (where \( D \) indicates data) and the non–homothetic CES aggregators from the model given the model parameters; we then minimize the difference between the \( \{\bar{P}_{st}, \bar{C}_{st}, \bar{P}_t, \bar{C}_t\} \) and the \( \{P_{st}, C_{st}, P_t, C_t\} \) that are generated by the model quantities \( \{C_{st}, C_{1t}, C_{2t}\} \).

To implement this, let us start with the definitions of the non–homothetic CES aggregators:

\[
C_t = \left( \alpha_s^1 \frac{P_{1t}(D)C_{1t}(D)}{P_{1t}(D)} \right)^{\sigma_s^{-1}} C_t^{\sigma_s^{-1}} + \alpha_s^2 \left( \frac{P_{2t}(D)C_{2t}(D)}{P_{2t}(D)} \right)^{\sigma_s^{-1}} C_t^{\sigma_s^{-1}} = 0
\]  

(18)

\[
C_{st} = \left( \alpha_s^1 \frac{P_{st}(D)C_{1t}(D)}{P_{st}(D)} \right)^{\sigma_s^{-1}} C_{st}^{\sigma_s^{-1}} + \alpha_s^2 \left( \frac{P_{2t}(D)C_{2t}(D)}{P_{2t}(D)} \right)^{\sigma_s^{-1}} C_{st}^{\sigma_s^{-1}} = 0
\]  

(19)

The first step is to substitute in the consumption quantities from the data so as to obtain the consumption aggregates that are implied by the data given the functional forms and the parameters of the model:

\[
\bar{C}_{st} = \left[ \alpha_s^1 \left( \frac{P_{1t}(D)C_{1t}(D)}{P_{1t}(D)} \right)^{\sigma_s^{-1}} C_t^{\sigma_s^{-1}} + \alpha_s^2 \left( \frac{P_{2t}(D)C_{2t}(D)}{P_{2t}(D)} \right)^{\sigma_s^{-1}} C_t^{\sigma_s^{-1}} \right]^{\sigma_s^{-1}} = 0
\]  

(20)

\[
\bar{C}_t = \left[ \alpha_s^1 \left( \frac{P_{st}(D)C_{1t}(D)}{P_{st}(D)} \right)^{\sigma_s^{-1}} C_t^{\sigma_s^{-1}} + \alpha_s^2 \left( \frac{P_{2t}(D)C_{2t}(D)}{P_{2t}(D)} \right)^{\sigma_s^{-1}} C_t^{\sigma_s^{-1}} \right]^{\sigma_s^{-1}} = 0
\]  

(21)
The next step is to solve this system of equations for $\tilde{C}_{st}$ and $\tilde{C}_t$. Then, we use definition of the price indexes to solve for the price indexes that are implied by the data given the functional forms and the parameters of the model:

$$\tilde{P}_{st} - \left[ \alpha_2 P_{2t}(D)^{1-\sigma_c} \tilde{C}_{t}^{\varepsilon_{2t}-1} + \alpha_1 P_{1t}(D)^{1-\sigma_c} \tilde{C}_{t}^{\varepsilon_{1t}-1} \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_{2t}}} = 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (22)

$$\tilde{P}_{t} - \left[ \alpha_s P_{gt}(D)^{1-\sigma_c} \tilde{C}_{t}^{\varepsilon_{gt}-1} + \alpha_s \tilde{P}_{st}(D)^{1-\sigma_c} \tilde{C}_{t}^{\varepsilon_{st}-1} \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_{gt}}} = 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (23)

We can now run an OLS regression of $\tilde{P}$ on $\tilde{C}$ and a constant. The slope coefficient contains the information on $\varepsilon_i$ that we are interested in, and so we can use it as a target in the calibration. This way of calibrating is called indirect inference: we use an auxiliary model (the equation that we estimate with OLS) and require the calibrated model to match an auxiliary parameter (here the slope of the estimated equation). Endogeneity is not a problem because we estimate the same equation on actual data and on simulated model data, so possible endogeneity appears in both equations in the same fashion. In sum, we target the expenditure shares from (17), $\tilde{C}_{st}/\tilde{C}_t$, $\tilde{P}_{st}/\tilde{P}_t$, and the OLS coefficient in the linear regression of $\tilde{P}_t$ on a constant and on $\tilde{C}_t$.

The calibration results are in Table 5. We find the expected parameter constellation for goods and services: they are complements ($\sigma_c < 1$); goods are necessities ($\varepsilon_g < 1$); services are luxuries ($\varepsilon_s > 1$). We also find the expected parameter constellation for services with fast and slow productivity growth: they are substitutes ($\sigma_s < 1$); services with fast productivity growth are necessities ($\varepsilon_1 < 1$); services with slow productivity growth are luxuries ($\varepsilon_2 > 1$). Moreover, the parameter values satisfy Assumptions 1–2. Figures 7, 8, and 9 show that the calibrated model matches well all targeted and several non–targeted moments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\alpha_g$</th>
<th>$\alpha_s$</th>
<th>$\alpha_1$</th>
<th>$\alpha_2$</th>
<th>$\sigma_s$</th>
<th>$\sigma_c$</th>
<th>$\varepsilon_g$</th>
<th>$\varepsilon_s$</th>
<th>$\varepsilon_1$</th>
<th>$\varepsilon_2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.2 Model simulation

To produce the out–of–sample predictions of our model, we simulate it forward for 2010–2070. We assume that between 2010–2070, the variables $\{A_{g}, A_{1t}, A_{2t}, P_{gt}\}$ grow at the same constant rates on average as they did “in the past”. The key issue to settle is what we mean by “in the past”. We start with calibrating to 20–year averages of sectoral TFP and taxes during 1990–2010, which is consistent with our previous focus on 20–year averages. For robustness, we also calibrate to the 30– and 40–year averages during 1980–2010 and 1970–2010. Table 6 shows the data inputs and the results. The top rows displays the average annual growth rate of aggregate
labor productivity, of \( \{A_{gt}, A_{t1}, A_{t2}, P_{gt}\} \), and of the average tax rates for different calibration periods. The bottom rows displays the implied average annual growth rates of aggregate labor productivity.

We measure the future unbalanced growth slowdown during 2010–2070 in the same two ways in which we measured it in the data for 1950–2010. In comparison, in the data the unbalanced growth slowdown between 1950–1970 and 1990–2010 was 0.25 percentage points. Second, if no structural transformation took place during 2010–2070, then the predicted average annual growth rates of labor productivity would be equal to that during the calibration periods, which are between 1.20% and 1.29%. In contrast, if structural transformation takes place during 2010–2070, then the model predicts average annual growth rates between 1.07% and 1.22%. Put together, the model predicts that without unbalanced growth slowdown average annual productivity growth would be at most 0.13 percentage points higher during 2010–2070. In comparison, in the data the corresponding number was 0.37 percentage points for 1950–2010.
Taken together, these two results imply that future unbalanced growth slowdown is smaller than past unbalanced growth slowdown, at least in percentage points.

It is important to realize that the model is essential for making these predictions. If instead
Figure 9: Consumption – Model and Data

(a) Service Consumption $C_s$  

(b) Aggregate Consumption $C$

(c) $C_s(t) / C(t)$ (Target)

Table 6: Future Unbalanced Growth Slowdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calibration Period</th>
<th>$\Delta LP$</th>
<th>$\Delta A_g/A_g$</th>
<th>$\Delta A_1/A_1$</th>
<th>$\Delta A_2/A_2$</th>
<th>$\Delta P_g/P_g$</th>
<th>$\tau_1$</th>
<th>$\tau_2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990–2010</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–2010</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970–2010</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicted Aggregate Productivity Growth (in %)</th>
<th>2010–30</th>
<th>2030–50</th>
<th>2050–70</th>
<th>2010–70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990–2010</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–2010</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970–2010</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

we had just run a simple regression on past data and extrapolated the result into the future, we would have gotten different results. For example, during the period from 1990–2010 the linear
fit of aggregate labor productivity gives a slope coefficient of -0.021. This implies that a simple extrapolation by 20 years would predict a slowdown from 1.30% to $1.30 - 0.022 \cdot 20 = 0.86\%$ which is quite far from what the model predicts. This means that the non–linear dynamics that results from the model is not well captured by a simple regression. Hence, the model is needed for making out–of-sample forecasts.

We end this section with providing some intuition for why our model predicts that future unbalanced growth slowdown will be limited. A first reason is that while the value added and the hours shares of services were not too different from those of goods in 1947, in 2010 they were almost four times those of goods. Hence, between 1947 and 2010 there was considerable reallocation from goods with the fastt productivity growth to services with slow productivity growth. While that led to productivity slowdown, now the goods sector is rather small and that source of unbalanced growth slow down is of much less importance in the future. Instead, the center stage is now taken by changes in the composition of the service sector, which lead to the reallocation between services with fast and slow productivity growth. Since the data suggest that these two services are substitutes, the model predicts that the services with slow productivity growth are not taking over the economy in the limit, which limits the extent of future productivity slowdown.

Our conclusion differs sharply from that of standard models of structural transformation. These models feature just one elasticity of substitution among the value added of all sectors, which is typically set such that the different sectoral value added are complements. They imply that the sector with the slowest productivity growth takes over in the limit. Since that sector essentially stagnated in the recent past, doing our extrapolation exercise with a standard model of structural transformation would predict that in the limit productivity growth falls all the way to zero.

6 Conclusion

We have demonstrated that structural transformation considerably slowed down productivity growth in the post World War II period. We have built a model that accounts for this. Our model implies that future structural transformation will not be more of a drag on productivity growth than it has been in the past. To reach this conclusion it has been crucial that we have disaggregated services into two subcategories that have fast and slow productivity growth. The data suggest that these two subcategories of services are substitutes. This implies that the services with slow productivity growth will not take over the economy in the limit, which is in sharp contrast to what existing models of structural transformation imply.

In this paper, we have taken the sectoral growth rates as given and we have explored which consequences changes in the sectoral composition have for unbalanced growth slowdown. A
first interesting question for future work is why different sectors show different productivity growth. A second interesting question for future work is to study whether the slow growing sectors will continue to grow slowly even when they comprise sizeable shares of the economy. We plan to tackle these questions in the future.

References


—— and ——, “Relative Prices and Sectoral Productivity,” Manuscript, University of Toronto 2016.


**Appendix A: Data Work**

**A Calculations behind Table 2**

**A.1 Preliminary remarks**

Conceptually, the first two columns of the table are the actual and the counterfactual accumulated growth factors where the counterfactual accumulated growth factor are calculated with the counterfactual sector labor shares from 1947:

\[
\frac{Y_{2010}}{H_{2010}} / \frac{Y_{1947}}{H_{1947}} \quad \text{and} \quad \left[ \sum_{i=g,1,2} \frac{H_{i,1947} Y_{i,2010}}{H_{1947} H_{i,2010}} \right] / \left[ \frac{Y_{1947}}{H_{1947}} \right]
\]

As in the body of the paper, \(Y\) and \(H\) denote real value added and hours worked. The third and the fourth column are the average annual growth rates that are calculated with sector labor shares from 2010 and 1947:

\[
\left\{ \left( \sum_{i=g,1,2} \frac{H_{i,2010} Y_{i,2010}}{H_{2010} H_{i,2010}} \right) / \left( \sum_{i=g,1,2} \frac{H_{i,2010} Y_{i,1947}}{H_{2010} H_{i,1947}} \right) \right\}^{1/63} = \left\{ \frac{Y_{2010}}{H_{2010}} / \left( \sum_{i=g,1,2} \frac{H_{i,2010} Y_{i,1947}}{H_{2010} H_{i,1947}} \right) \right\}^{1/63}
\]

and

\[
\left\{ \left( \sum_{i=g,1,2} \frac{H_{i,1947} Y_{i,2010}}{H_{1947} H_{i,2010}} \right) / \left( \sum_{i=g,1,2} \frac{H_{i,1947} Y_{i,1947}}{H_{1947} H_{i,1947}} \right) \right\}^{1/63} = \left\{ \left( \sum_{i=g,1,2} \frac{H_{i,1947} Y_{i,1947}}{H_{1947} H_{i,1947}} \right) / \frac{Y_{1947}}{H_{1947}} \right\}^{1/63}
\]

In practise, these statistics are unfortunately not as straightforward to calculate as the above formulas suggest. The complications arise from the fact that WORLD KLEMS calculates quantity and price indices according to a Törnqvist aggregation procedure, which implies that the quantity indices are not additive. Below we describe how average annual growth rates and accumulated growth factors can be calculated without imposing additivity.
A.2 Aggregate growth rates as sector aggregates

The growth rate of a variable in period \( t \) is defined by the log difference between periods \( t \) and \( t - 1 \). The aggregate growth rates of real value added, \( Y_t \), and efficiency hours, \( H_t \), are defined as the weighted averages of the corresponding sectoral growth rates:

\[
\Delta \ln(Y_t) \equiv \sum_{i=g,1,2} S_i(Y_{it}) \Delta \ln(Y_{it})
\]

\[
\Delta \ln(H_t) \equiv \sum_{i=g,1,2} S_i(H_{it}) \Delta \ln(H_{it}),
\]

where \( S_i(Y_{it}) \) and \( S_i(H_{it}) \) denote the averages over periods \( t \) and \( t - 1 \) of the nominal shares of sector \( i \)'s value added and compensation of labor in the corresponding totals. We use averages here because the shares are used as weights of growth rates from one period to the next.

A.3 Aggregate productivity measures as sector aggregates

We first calculate the growth rate of aggregate value added per hour:

\[
\Delta \ln(LP(H_t)) \equiv \Delta \ln(Y_t) - \Delta \ln(H_t)
\]

\[
= \sum_{i=g,1,2} S_i(Y_{it}) \left[ \Delta \ln(Y_{it}) - \Delta \ln(H_{it}) \right] + \sum_{i=g,1,2} S_i(Y_{it}) \Delta \ln(H_{it}) - \Delta \ln(H_t).
\]

Since,

\[
\Delta \ln(H_t) = \ln \left( \frac{H_t}{H_{t-1}} \right) = \ln \left( \frac{\sum_{i=g,1,2} (H_{it} - H_{it-1} + H_{it-1})}{H_{t-1}} \right)
\]

\[
= \ln \left( 1 + \sum_{i=g,1,2} \frac{H_{it-1} H_{it} - H_{it-1} H_{it}}{H_{t-1}} \right) \approx \sum_{i=g,1,2} \frac{H_{it-1}}{H_{t-1}} \Delta \ln(H_{it}).
\]

the growth rate of aggregate value added per hour is approximately equal to

\[
\Delta \ln(LP(H_t)) = \sum_{i=g,1,2} S_i(Y_{it}) \Delta \ln(LP(H_{it})) + \sum_{i=g,1,2} \left[ S_i(Y_{it}) - \frac{H_{it-1}}{H_{t-1}} \right] \Delta \ln(H_{it}) \quad (25)
\]

We now turn to the calculation of the growth rates of aggregate value added per efficiency hour. Applying the definitions (24), we obtain:

\[
\Delta \ln \left( LP(H_t) \right) \equiv \Delta \ln(Y_t) - \Delta \ln(H_t) = \sum_{i=g,1,2} S_i(Y_{it}) \Delta \ln(Y_{it}) - \sum_{i=g,1,2} S_i(H_{it}) \Delta \ln(H_{it})
\]

\[
= \sum_{i=g,1,2} S_i(Y_{it}) \Delta \ln \left( LP(H_{it}) \right) + \sum_{i=g,1,2} \left[ S_i(Y_{it}) - S_i(H_{it}) \right] \Delta \ln(H_{it}). \quad (26)
\]
Thus, the growth rate of aggregate value added per efficiency hour is the sum of the weighted average of the growth rates of sector value added per efficiency hour and a correction term, which captures the role of the difference between the sectoral–value–added shares and the sectoral–labor–compensation shares, \([S(Y_i) - S(\tilde{H}_i)]\).

### A.4 Counterfactual experiments

To assess the effect of structural transformation on aggregate productivity growth, we define counterfactual labor productivity measures with fixed period–\(T\) sector weights using expressions (25) and (26):

\[
\begin{align*}
\Delta \ln \left( LP(H_t, T) \right) & \approx \sum_{i=g,1,2} S(Y_{iT}) \Delta \ln \left( LP(H_{it}) \right) + \sum_{i=g,1,2} \left( S(Y_{iT}) - \frac{H_{iT}}{H_{T-1}} \right) \Delta \ln(H_{it}), \\
\Delta \ln \left( LP(\tilde{H}_t, T) \right) & = \sum_{i=g,1,2} S(Y_{iT}) \Delta \ln \left( LP(\tilde{H}_{it}) \right) + \sum_{i=g,1,2} \left( S(Y_{iT}) - S(\tilde{H}_{iT}) \right) \Delta \ln(\tilde{H}_{it}).
\end{align*}
\]

The first two columns of Tables 2 compare the actual with the counterfactual accumulated growth factors of GDP between 1948 and 2010 where the counterfactual accumulated growth factor is calculated with the counterfactual sectoral weights from 1947/48:

\[
\begin{align*}
\exp\left( \sum_{t=1948}^{2010} \Delta \ln \left( LP(H_t) \right) \right) & \text{ vs } \exp\left( \sum_{t=1948}^{2010} \Delta \ln \left( LP(H_t, 1948) \right) \right), \\
\exp\left( \sum_{t=1948}^{2010} \Delta \ln \left( LP(\tilde{H}_t) \right) \right) & \text{ vs } \exp\left( \sum_{t=1948}^{2010} \Delta \ln \left( LP(\tilde{H}_t, 1948) \right) \right).
\end{align*}
\]

The last two columns of Tables 2 compare the average growth rates calculated with the sector weights from 2010 and 1948:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{1}{63} \sum_{t=1948}^{2010} \Delta \ln \left( LP(H_t, 2010) \right) & \text{ vs } \frac{1}{63} \sum_{t=1948}^{2010} \Delta \ln \left( LP(H_t, 1948) \right), \\
\frac{1}{63} \sum_{t=1948}^{2010} \Delta \ln \left( LP(\tilde{H}_t, 2010) \right) & \text{ vs } \frac{1}{63} \sum_{t=1948}^{2010} \Delta \ln \left( LP(\tilde{H}_t, 1948) \right).
\end{align*}
\]

\[14\] Recall that to calculate the sectoral weights we take averages over 1948 and 1947.

\[15\] Recall that to calculate the sectoral weights we take averages over 2009–2010 and 1947–1948.
Appendix B: Derivations and Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1

Rewrite (2a) as

\[ 1 = \alpha_c^{\sigma_c} \frac{\epsilon_c^2}{\sigma_c} \left( \frac{\epsilon_c}{\sigma_c} \right)^{\sigma_c-1} C_1^{\sigma_c} + \alpha_s^{\sigma_c} \frac{\epsilon_s^2}{\sigma_c} \left( \frac{\epsilon_s}{\sigma_c} \right)^{\sigma_c-1} C_{st}^{\sigma_c} \]

Differentiating with respect to \( C_{gl} \) gives:

\[ 0 = \frac{1}{\sigma_c} \frac{\epsilon_c}{\sigma_c} C_1 \frac{\partial C_1}{\partial C_{gl}} \left( \frac{\epsilon_c}{\sigma_c} \right)^{\sigma_c-1} + \frac{1}{\sigma_c} \frac{\epsilon_s}{\sigma_c} C_{st} \frac{\partial C_{st}}{\partial C_{gl}} \left( \frac{\epsilon_s}{\sigma_c} \right)^{\sigma_c-1} \]

Solving for the partial derivative gives:

\[ \frac{\partial C_1}{\partial C_{gl}} = \frac{1}{\left( 1 - \sigma_c \right) \alpha_c^{\sigma_c} \frac{\epsilon_c}{\sigma_c} \left( C_{gl} \right) \left( \frac{\epsilon_c}{\sigma_c} \right)^{\sigma_c-1} + \left( \epsilon_s - \sigma_c \right) \alpha_s^{\sigma_c} \frac{\epsilon_s}{\sigma_c} \left( C_{st} \right) \left( \frac{\epsilon_c}{\sigma_c} \right)^{\sigma_c-1}} \]

(30)

Similar derivations yield:

\[ \frac{\partial C_1}{\partial C_{it}} = \frac{1}{\left( 1 - \sigma_c \right) \alpha_i^{\sigma_c} \frac{\epsilon_i}{\sigma_c} \left( C_{it} \right) \left( \frac{\epsilon_i}{\sigma_c} \right)^{\sigma_c-1} + \left( \epsilon_s - \sigma_c \right) \alpha_s^{\sigma_c} \frac{\epsilon_s}{\sigma_c} \left( C_{st} \right) \left( \frac{\epsilon_i}{\sigma_c} \right)^{\sigma_c-1}} \]

(31a)

\[ \frac{\partial C_{st}}{\partial C_{jt}} = \frac{1}{\left( 1 - \sigma_c \right) \alpha_1^{\sigma_c} \frac{\epsilon_1}{\sigma_c} \left( C_{st} \right) \left( \frac{\epsilon_1}{\sigma_c} \right)^{\sigma_c-1} + \left( \epsilon_s - \sigma_c \right) \alpha_2^{\sigma_c} \frac{\epsilon_2}{\sigma_c} \left( C_{st} \right) \left( \frac{\epsilon_1}{\sigma_c} \right)^{\sigma_c-1}} \]

(31b)

Clearly, Assumption 1 is sufficient for these partial derivatives to be positive. To see that it is also necessary, let’s pick one of them, \( \partial C_i/\partial C_{gl} \) and note that the proof for the others is analogous. The right–hand side of equation (30) then has to be positive for all non–negative \( (C_{gl}, C_{st}) \). For \( \sigma_c > 1 \) and \( C_{st} = 0 \) or for \( \sigma_c < 1 \) and \( C_{st} \rightarrow \infty \), this amounts to:

\[ \frac{\partial C_1}{\partial C_{gl}} = \frac{1}{\left( 1 - \sigma_c \right) \alpha_c^{\sigma_c} \frac{\epsilon_c}{\sigma_c} \left( C_{gl} \right) \left( \frac{\epsilon_c}{\sigma_c} \right)^{\sigma_c-1} + \left( \epsilon_s - \sigma_c \right) \alpha_s^{\sigma_c} \frac{\epsilon_s}{\sigma_c} \left( C_{st} \right) \left( \frac{\epsilon_c}{\sigma_c} \right)^{\sigma_c-1}} > 0 \]

For \( \sigma_c > 1 \) this is the case if and only if \( \sigma_c > \epsilon_c \) and for \( \sigma_c < 1 \) this is the case if and only
if $\sigma_c < \varepsilon_g$. Using the same arguments for $\partial C_i/\partial C_{st}$ shows that to have both partial derivatives positive requires either $\sigma_c < \min\{\varepsilon_g, \varepsilon_s\}$ or $\max\{\varepsilon_g, \varepsilon_s\} < \sigma_c$. This is Assumption 1 for $i = g, s$. QED

**Derivation of equilibrium conditions**

The first–order condition to the inner and outer parts of the household’s problem are:

\[
P_{jt} = \mu_i \alpha_i^{\sigma_i} C_{jt}^{\sigma_i} C_i^{\sigma_i} C_{st}^{\sigma_i}, \quad j = 1, 2 \tag{32a}
\]
\[
P_{it} = \lambda_i \alpha_i^{\sigma_i} C_{it}^{\sigma_i} C_i^{\sigma_i} C_t^{\sigma_i}, \quad i = g, s \tag{32b}
\]

To derive (7b), multiply both sides of (32a) with $C_{jt}$ and adding up the resulting equations, we get

\[
P_{1t} C_{1t} + P_{2t} C_{2t} = \mu_t \left( \frac{1}{\alpha_1^{\sigma_1} C_i^{\sigma_1} C_{1t}^{\sigma_1}} + \frac{1}{\alpha_2^{\sigma_2} C_i^{\sigma_2} C_{2t}^{\sigma_2}} \right) C_{st}^{\sigma_i} = \mu_t C_{st} \tag{33}
\]

which implies that

\[
P_{st} = \frac{P_{1t} C_{1t} + P_{2t} C_{2t}}{C_{st}} = \mu_t \tag{34}
\]

Rewriting (32a) again

\[
P_{jt}^{1-\sigma_j} = P_{jt}^{1-\alpha_j} \frac{1}{\alpha_j^{\sigma_j} C_{jt}^{\sigma_j} C_i^{\sigma_j} C_{st}^{\sigma_i}}
\]

which implies

\[
\alpha_j C_{jt}^{\sigma_j - 1} P_{jt}^{1-\sigma_j} = P_{jt}^{1-\sigma_j} \frac{1}{\alpha_j^{\sigma_j} C_{jt}^{\sigma_j} C_i^{\sigma_j} C_{st}^{\sigma_i}} \tag{33}
\]

Adding this up over $j = 1, 2$ yields

\[
\alpha_1 C_i^{\sigma_i - 1} P_{1t}^{1-\sigma_i} + \alpha_2 C_i^{\sigma_i - 1} P_{2t}^{1-\sigma_i} = P_{st}^{1-\sigma_i} \left( \frac{1}{\alpha_1^{\sigma_1} C_i^{\sigma_i} C_{1t}^{\sigma_i}} + \frac{1}{\alpha_2^{\sigma_2} C_i^{\sigma_2} C_{2t}^{\sigma_2}} \right) C_{st}^{\sigma_i}
\]

implying that the price index is given as

\[
P_{st} = \left( \alpha_1 C_i^{\sigma_i - 1} P_{1t}^{1-\sigma_i} + \alpha_2 C_i^{\sigma_i - 1} P_{2t}^{1-\sigma_i} \right)^{1-\sigma_i}
\]
which is (7b). Similar steps give (8b) and (8c).

To derive expressions for the expenditure shares, we rewrite the relative expenditure share (8a) as

\[ P_{it} = \alpha_i \frac{\epsilon_i e_{it}}{\alpha_s e_{st}} \frac{P_{it}C_{it}}{P_{it}C_{it}} \quad i = \{g, s\} \]

Summing over \( i = \{g, s\} \) yields

\[ P_{gl}C_{gl} + P_{sl}C_{st} = \left( \alpha_i C_{it}^\epsilon e_{it} + \alpha_s C_{st}^\epsilon e_{st} \right) \frac{P_{it}C_{it}}{\alpha_s e_{st}} \frac{P_{it}C_{it}}{P_{it}C_{it}} \]

Hence, the expenditure shares of \( i = \{g, s\} \) can be expressed as

\[ \chi_{it} \equiv \frac{P_{it}C_{it}}{P_{it}C_{it}} = \frac{\alpha_i C_{it}^\epsilon e_{it}}{\alpha_s C_{it}^\epsilon e_{it} + \alpha_s e_{it}} = \frac{\alpha_i C_{it}^\epsilon}{\alpha_s C_{it}^\epsilon + \alpha_s e_{it}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (35a)

where \( P_tC_t = P_{it}C_{it} + P_{st}C_{st} \). A similar derivation for \( j = 1, 2 \) yields

\[ \chi_{jt} \equiv \frac{P_{jt}C_{jt}}{P_{jt}C_{jt}} = \frac{\alpha_j C_{jt}^\epsilon e_{jt}}{\alpha_1 C_{jt}^\epsilon e_{jt} + \alpha_2 e_{jt}} = \frac{\alpha_j C_{jt}^\epsilon}{\alpha_1 C_{jt}^\epsilon + \alpha_2 e_{jt}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (35b)

Combining (8c) and (35a), we obtain

\[ \chi_{it} = \alpha_i \frac{\epsilon_i e_{it}}{\alpha_s e_{st}} \left( \frac{P_{it}}{P_{it}C_{it}} \right)^{1-\sigma_i} \quad i = \{g, s\} \]

which is (36a). Similarly, we obtain (36b)

\[ \chi_{jt} = \alpha_j \frac{\epsilon_j e_{jt}}{\alpha_s e_{st}} \left( \frac{P_{jt}}{P_{jt}C_{jt}} \right)^{1-\sigma_j} \quad j = \{1, 2\} \]

where \( P_{st}C_{st} = P_{1t}C_{1t} + P_{2t}C_{2t} \).

For what follows, it is also sometimes useful to have expressions for the expenditure shares. Appendix B shows that

\[ \chi_{it} = \alpha_i \frac{\epsilon_i e_{it}}{\alpha_s e_{st}} \left( \frac{P_{it}}{P_{it}C_{it}} \right)^{1-\sigma_i} \quad i = \{g, s\} \]  \hspace{1cm} (36a)

\[ \chi_{jt} = \alpha_j \frac{\epsilon_j e_{jt}}{\alpha_s e_{st}} \left( \frac{P_{jt}}{P_{jt}C_{jt}} \right)^{1-\sigma_j} \quad j = \{1, 2\} \]  \hspace{1cm} (36b)

where \( P_{st}C_{st} = P_{1t}C_{1t} + P_{2t}C_{2t} \). QED
Interpretation of Assumption 6

First we express consumption expenditures as function of prices and \( C_t \). Combining (8c) and (7b), and using the fact that \( P_{gt} = 1 \), we get

\[
E_t \equiv P_t C_t = \left( \alpha_g C_t^{\epsilon_g - \sigma_c} + \alpha_s C_t^{\epsilon_s - \sigma_c} \left( \alpha_1 C_t^{\epsilon_1 - 1} P_{1t}^{1 - \sigma_c} + \alpha_2 C_t^{\epsilon_2 - 1} P_{2t}^{1 - \sigma_c} \right) \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma_c}}
\]  

(37)

Next we take the derivative of \( E_t \) with respect to \( C_t \) using (37)

\[
\frac{\partial E_t}{\partial C_t} = \frac{1}{1 - \sigma_c} \left[ \epsilon_g - \sigma_c + \frac{\epsilon_s - \sigma_c}{C_t} + \frac{1 - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_s} \chi_{st} \left( \frac{\epsilon_1 - 1}{C_t} + \frac{\epsilon_2 - 1}{C_t} \right) \right]
\]

Using the expression for expenditure shares in (35a), we can simplify this as

\[
\frac{\partial E_t}{\partial C_t} = \frac{E_t}{1 - \sigma_c} \left[ \chi_{gt} + \frac{\epsilon_s - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_c} \chi_{st} + \frac{\epsilon_1 - 1}{1 - \sigma_s} \chi_{1t} + \frac{\epsilon_2 - 1}{1 - \sigma_s} \chi_{2t} \right]
\]

(38)

It follows that the elasticity in question is

\[
\frac{C_t \partial E_t}{E_t \partial C_t} = \frac{\epsilon_g - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_c} \chi_{gt} + \frac{\epsilon_s - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_c} \chi_{st} + \frac{\epsilon_1 - 1}{1 - \sigma_s} \chi_{1t} + \frac{\epsilon_2 - 1}{1 - \sigma_s} \chi_{2t}
\]

We can restate this condition as

\[
\frac{C_t \partial E_t}{E_t \partial C_t} = \frac{\epsilon_g - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_c} \chi_{gt} + \left( \frac{\epsilon_s - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_c} + \frac{\epsilon_1 - 1}{1 - \sigma_s} \chi_{gt} \right) \chi_{st}
\]

Since \((\epsilon_1 - \epsilon_2)/(1 - \sigma_s) > 0\), we have

\[
\frac{C_t \partial E_t}{E_t \partial C_t} \geq \frac{\epsilon_g - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_c} \chi_{gt} + \left( \frac{\epsilon_s - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_c} + \frac{\epsilon_1 - \epsilon_2}{1 - \sigma_s} \chi_{gt} \right) \chi_{st}
\]

Next we use that \( \chi_{gt} = 1 - \chi_{st} \).

\[
\frac{C_t \partial E_t}{E_t \partial C_t} \geq \frac{\epsilon_g - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_c} + \left( \frac{\epsilon_s - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_c} + \frac{\epsilon_1 - \epsilon_2 - \epsilon_s + \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_s} \right) \chi_{st} \geq \frac{\epsilon_g - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_c}
\]

which says that the elasticity of consumption expenditures with respect to real consumption is non-negative.
Proof of Lemma 2

First rewrite (8c) as

\[(P_t C_t)^{1-\sigma_c} = \alpha g C_t^{\sigma_c} P_{gt}^{1-\sigma_c} + \alpha s C_t^{\sigma_s} P_{st}^{1-\sigma_s} \quad (39)\]

Taking into account that the taxes are rebated we have

\[P_t C_t = A_{gt} H_{gt} + P_{1t} A_{1t} H_{1t} + P_{2t} A_{2t} H_{2t} = A_{gt}\]

which implies that

\[\hat{P} C_{t+1} = \hat{A}_{gt+1} = \gamma_g\]

Using this and recalling (35a), we can rewrite the growth rate of consumption expenditure as

\[\gamma_g^{1-\sigma_c} = \frac{\hat{P} C_{t+1}}{\gamma_g} = \frac{\gamma_1}{\gamma_1} C_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_c} + \frac{\gamma_2}{\gamma_2} C_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_s} = \gamma_1 C_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_c} + \gamma_2 C_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_s} \quad (40)\]

Using equations (7b) and (35b) and the equilibrium relation for relative prices, \(P_\beta = A_{gt}/A_{jt}\), we obtain

\[\frac{\hat{P}_{st+1}^{1-\sigma_s}}{\gamma_1} = \frac{\gamma_2}{\gamma_1} C_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_c} + \frac{\gamma_2}{\gamma_2} C_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_s} \]

Combining (40) and (41), and rearranging, we get

\[1 = \frac{\gamma_1}{\gamma_2} C_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_c} + \frac{\gamma_2}{\gamma_1} C_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_s} + \frac{\gamma_2}{\gamma_2} C_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_s} \quad (42)\]

We first derive a lower bound on \(\hat{C}_{t+1}\). Note that the following inequalities hold

\[\frac{\epsilon_\sigma - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_c} < \frac{\epsilon_\sigma - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_s} + \frac{\epsilon_2 - 1}{1 - \sigma_s} < \frac{\epsilon_\sigma - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_c} + \frac{\epsilon_1 - 1}{1 - \sigma_s} \quad (43)\]

The first inequality is our Assumption 6, and the second inequality follows from Assumption 5, \(\sigma_s > 1, \epsilon_1 < 1 < \epsilon_2\). Using these inequalities and Assumption 3 that \(\gamma_g > \gamma_2, \gamma_1\), equation (42)
implies the inequality
\[
1 > X_g^t \left( \frac{e_1 - \sigma}{C_t + 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma_s}} + X_{it} \left( \frac{e_1 - \sigma_s}{C_t + 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma_s}} + X_{2t} \left( \frac{e_1 - \sigma_s}{C_t + 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma_s}}
\]
which implies the claimed upper bound:
\[
\frac{1}{\gamma_{g}^{1 - \sigma_s}} \geq C_t + 1
\]
To derive the lower bound, we use again the inequalities (43) and \( \gamma_2 < \gamma_g, \gamma_1 \). Equation (42) then implies the following inequality:
\[
1 < X_g^t \left( \frac{e_1 - \sigma}{C_t + 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma_s}} + X_{it} \left( \frac{e_1 - \sigma_s}{C_t + 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma_s}} + X_{2t} \left( \frac{e_1 - \sigma_s}{C_t + 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma_s}}
\]
which implies the lower bound:
\[
\frac{(1 - \sigma_s)(1 - \sigma_s)}{\gamma_2^{(e_1 - 1)(1 - \sigma_s) + (e_1 - \sigma_s)(1 - \sigma_s)}} \leq C_t + 1
\]
QED

**Proof of Lemma 3**

Using equations (7b) and (35b) and the equilibrium relation for relative prices, \( P_{ji} = A_{gt}/A_{ji} \), we obtain
\[
\tilde{P}_{st+1} = \left[ X_{1t} \tilde{P}_{1r+1(t+1)}^{1 - \sigma_s} C_{t+1}^{e_1 - 1} + X_{2t} \tilde{P}_{2r+1(t+1)}^{1 - \sigma_s} C_{t+1}^{e_2 - 1} \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma_s}}
\]
\[
= \left[ X_{1t} \left( \frac{\gamma_{g}^{e_1 - 1}}{\gamma_{1}^{C_{t+1}^{1 - \sigma_s}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma_s}} + X_{2t} \left( \frac{\gamma_{g}^{e_2 - 1}}{\gamma_{2}^{C_{t+1}^{1 - \sigma_s}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma_s}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma_s}}
\]
(44)
The term in the square bracket in the (44) is of the form \( X_{1t} x_{1t}^{1 - \sigma_s} + (1 - X_{1t}) x_{2t}^{1 - \sigma_s} \). Since \( 1 < \sigma_s \), we know that \( x^{1 - \sigma_s} \) is a convex function. Hence,
\[
X_{1t} x_{1t}^{1 - \sigma_s} + (1 - X_{1t}) x_{2t}^{1 - \sigma_s} \leq [X_{1t} x_{1t} + (1 - X_{1t}) x_{2t}]^{1 - \sigma_s}
\]
Since the exponent on the square brackets is negative, \( 1 - \sigma_s < 0 \), this implies that

\[
\hat{P}_{st+1} \geq \chi_{1t} \gamma_s \frac{\gamma_1^{\frac{\epsilon_1 - 1}{\epsilon_1 - \sigma_s}}}{\gamma_1 C_{t+1}^{\frac{\epsilon_1 - 1}{\epsilon_1 - \sigma_s}}} + \chi_{2t} \gamma_s \frac{\gamma_2^{\frac{\epsilon_2 - 1}{\epsilon_2 - \sigma_s}}}{\gamma_2 C_{t+1}^{\frac{\epsilon_2 - 1}{\epsilon_2 - \sigma_s}}} = \left( \chi_{1t} \gamma_2 \frac{\gamma_1^{\frac{\epsilon_1 - 1}{\epsilon_1 - \sigma_s}}}{\gamma_1 C_{t+1}^{\frac{\epsilon_1 - 1}{\epsilon_1 - \sigma_s}}} + \chi_{2t} \right) \frac{\gamma_s}{\gamma_2} \frac{\gamma_2^{\frac{\epsilon_2 - 1}{\epsilon_2 - \sigma_s}}}{C_{t+1}^{\frac{\epsilon_2 - 1}{\epsilon_2 - \sigma_s}}},
\]

The term in the round brackets is increasing in \( C_{t+1} \) because \( \epsilon_1 - \epsilon_2 < 0 \) and \( 1 - \sigma_s < 0 \). Hence the inequality is satisfied at the lower bound for \( C_{t+1} \) given by (12a). Taking account the parameter restriction from (13a), we conclude that the lower bound on the coefficient of \( \chi_{1t} \) is larger then 1. Hence the inequality can be restated as

\[
\hat{P}_{st+1} > \frac{\gamma_s}{\gamma_2} \frac{\gamma_2^{1 - \sigma_s}}{C_{t+1}^{1 - \sigma_s}}
\]

The right–hand side is larger than one if and only if

\[
\left( \frac{\gamma_g}{\gamma_2} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_2 - 1}{\epsilon_2 - \sigma_s}} > \hat{C}_{t+1}
\]

A sufficient condition for this is that

\[
\left( \frac{\gamma_g}{\gamma_2} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_2 - 1}{\epsilon_2 - \sigma_s}} > \bar{C}
\]

Using Lemma 2, this is equivalent to:

\[
\left( \frac{\gamma_g}{\gamma_2} \right)^{\frac{1 - \sigma_s}{\epsilon_2 - \sigma_s}} > \gamma_g \frac{1 - \sigma_s}{\epsilon_2 - \sigma_s}
\]

Rearranging gives inequality (13b). QED

**Proof of Proposition 1**

Using equation (36a), the growth rate of the expenditure share of goods follows as

\[
\frac{X_{gt+1}}{X_{gt}} = \left( \frac{P_{gt+1} P_t C_t}{P_{gt} P_{t+1} C_{t+1}} \right)^{1 - \sigma_s} \bar{C}_{t+1}^{-\sigma_s}
\]

Using that \( P_{gt} = 1 \) and that \( P_t C_t \) is growing at rate \( \gamma_g \), the previous equation can be rewritten as

\[
\frac{X_{gt+1}}{X_{gt}} = \frac{1}{\gamma_g} \bar{C}_{t+1}^{1 - \sigma_s}.
\]
Using the upper bound from Lemma 2, we have

$$\frac{\chi_{g(t+1)}}{\chi_{gt}} < \frac{1}{\gamma_g^{1-\sigma_c}} \left( \frac{1-\sigma_e}{\epsilon_g - \sigma_e} \right)^{\epsilon_g - \sigma_e} = 1.$$  \quad (47)

It follows now that \(\chi_{g(t+1)} < \chi_{gt}\) for all \(t\).

To see why it is not possible that \(\lim_{t \to \infty} \chi_{gt} = \chi_{gt}^* > 0\), consider equation (46). It implies that \(\chi_{gt}\) converges to a positive limit if \(\tilde{C}_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_c} \chi_{gt}\) converges to \(\gamma_g^{1-\sigma_c}\). We know from the previous argument that \(\chi_{gt}\) is decreasing over time and that

$$\tilde{C}_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_c} < \gamma_g^{1-\sigma_c}.$$  

If \(\tilde{C}_{t+1}\) decreases when \(\chi_{gt}\) decreases, then we are done because it implies that \(\tilde{C}_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_c}\) shrinks further away from \(\gamma_g^{1-\sigma_c}\) as time evolves.

To show that \(\tilde{C}_{t+1}\) decreases when \(\chi_{gt}\) decreases, recall the equilibrium condition (42)

$$1 = \chi_{gt} \left( \frac{\tilde{C}_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_c}}{\gamma_g} \right)^{1-\sigma_c} + \chi_{st} \left( \frac{\tilde{C}_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_c} + 1}{\gamma_1} \right)^{1-\sigma_s} + \chi_{2t} \left( \frac{\tilde{C}_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_c} + 1}{\gamma_2} \right)^{1-\sigma_s}.$$  

If

$$\left( \frac{\tilde{C}_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_c}}{\gamma_g} \right)^{1-\sigma_c} < \chi_{1t} \left( \frac{\tilde{C}_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_c} + 1}{\gamma_1} \right)^{1-\sigma_s} + \chi_{2t} \left( \frac{\tilde{C}_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_c} + 1}{\gamma_2} \right)^{1-\sigma_s},$$  

for all \(\chi_{1t}, \chi_{2t} = 1 - \chi_{1t}\), then decreasing \(\chi_{gt}\) and thereby increasing \(\chi_{st} = 1 - \chi_{gt}\) increases the right-hand side. To restore the equality with 1, the right-hand side must decrease. Since the assumptions imply that

$$0 < \frac{\epsilon_g - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_c} < \frac{\epsilon_s - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_s} + \frac{\epsilon_2 - 1}{1 - \sigma_c} < \frac{\epsilon_s - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_s} + \frac{\epsilon_1 - 1}{1 - \sigma_s},$$  \quad (49)

implies that both terms on the right-hand side increase in \(\tilde{C}_{t+1}\), the right-hand side decreases if \(\tilde{C}_{t+1}\) decreases.

To complete the proof, we have to show that Assumptions 1–6 implies (48). To see this,
rearrange (48) as

\[
\left( \frac{\varepsilon_s - \sigma_c}{\hat{C}_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_s} \gamma_g} \right)^{1-\sigma_s} > \chi_{1t} \left( \frac{\varepsilon_s - \sigma_c + \sigma_c - \sigma_c}{\hat{C}_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_s} \gamma_1} \right)^{1-\sigma_s} + \chi_{2t} \left( \frac{\varepsilon_s - \sigma_c + \sigma_c - \sigma_c + \varepsilon_1 - 1}{\hat{C}_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_s} \gamma_2} \right)^{1-\sigma_s}
\]

where we used that \( \sigma_c < 1 \) and \( \sigma_s > 1 \). To derive a sufficient condition for this inequality to hold, increase the right-hand side by replacing \( \gamma_2 \) with \( \gamma_1 \) and \( \varepsilon_1 \) with \( \varepsilon_2 \) (recall \( 1 - \sigma_s < 0 \)):

\[
\left( \frac{\varepsilon_s - \sigma_c}{\hat{C}_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_s} \gamma_g} \right)^{1-\sigma_s} > \chi_{1t} \left( \frac{\varepsilon_s - \sigma_c + \sigma_c - \sigma_c}{\hat{C}_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_s} \gamma_1} \right)^{1-\sigma_s} + \chi_{2t} \left( \frac{\varepsilon_s - \sigma_c + \sigma_c - \sigma_c + \varepsilon_2 - 1}{\hat{C}_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_s} \gamma_1} \right)^{1-\sigma_s} = \left( \frac{\varepsilon_s - \sigma_c + \sigma_c - \sigma_c + \varepsilon_2 - 1}{\hat{C}_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_s} \gamma_1} \right)^{1-\sigma_s}
\]

Since \( \gamma_g > \gamma_1 \) and

\[
\frac{\varepsilon_g - \sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_c} \leq \frac{\varepsilon_s - \sigma_c + \sigma_c - \sigma_c + \varepsilon_2 - 1}{1 - \sigma_c + 1 - \sigma_s},
\]

this inequality holds. Since this sufficient condition does not feature \( \chi_{gt}, \chi_{st} \), inequality (48) holds for all expenditure shares. QED

**Proof of Proposition 3**

The claim is implied by the proof of Proposition 1. QED

**Proof of Lemma 4**

It is straightforward to show that:

\[
\hat{Y}_{la}^t = \frac{P_t Y_t}{P_{la}^t}, \quad \hat{Y}_{pa}^t = \frac{P_t Y_t}{P_{pa}^t}
\]

Hence,

\[
\hat{Y}_{ch}^t = \sqrt{\hat{Y}_{la}^t \times \hat{Y}_{pa}^t} = \sqrt{\frac{P_t Y_t}{P_{la}^t} \times \frac{P_t Y_t}{P_{pa}^t}} = \frac{P_t Y_t}{P_{ch}^t}
\]

QED
Proof of Proposition 4

We want to show that the growth factor in units of the current-period numeraire $C_{jt}$ is given by

$$\hat{Y}_{jt}^{n} = \gamma_{j}.$$ Using (3b) and (4), we have

$$\hat{Y}_{jt}^{n} = \frac{\sum_{i=g,1,2} A_{jt} P_{jt} \frac{P_{it}}{P_{jt}}}{\sum_{i=g,1,2} A_{jt-1} H_{jt-1} \frac{P_{it-1}}{P_{jt-1}}} = \frac{A_{jt} \sum_{i=g,1,2} A_{jt} P_{jt} H_{jt}}{A_{jt-1} \sum_{i=g,1,2} A_{jt-1} H_{jt-1}} = \gamma_{j}$$

where we used that $\sum_{i=g,1,2} A_{jt} = \sum_{i=g,1,2} A_{jt-1} = 1$. QED

Proof of Proposition 5

That the growth factor with a current-period numeraire is constant follows from Lemma 1.

To show that $\Delta \hat{Y}_{jt}^{ch} < 0$, we will show that $\Delta \hat{Y}_{jt}^{la} < 0$ and $\Delta \hat{Y}_{jt}^{na} < 0$. We start with the Laspeyres Quantity Index with period t–1 as the base year for the prices:

$$\hat{Y}_{jt}^{la} = \frac{P_{jt-1} C_{jt} + P_{1t-1} C_{1t} + P_{2t-1} C_{2t}}{P_{jt-1} C_{jt-1} + P_{1t-1} C_{1t-1} + P_{2t-1} C_{2t-1}}$$

$$= \frac{P_{jt-1} C_{jt-1} C_{gt-1} + P_{jt-1} C_{1t-1} C_{1t} + P_{jt-1} C_{2t-1} C_{2t}}{P_{jt-1} C_{jt-1} C_{gt-1} + P_{jt-1} C_{1t-1} C_{1t} + P_{jt-1} C_{2t-1} C_{2t}}$$

$$= \frac{H_{jt-1} A_{jt} H_{gt}}{H_{jt-1} A_{jt-1} H_{jt-1}} + \frac{H_{1t-1} A_{1t} H_{1t}}{H_{1t-1} A_{1t-1} H_{1t-1}} + \frac{H_{2t-1} A_{2t} H_{2t}}{H_{2t-1} A_{2t-1} H_{2t-1}}$$

$$= \gamma_{g} H_{gt} + \gamma_{1} H_{1t} + \gamma_{2} H_{2t}$$

$$= \gamma_{g}(1 - H_{st}) + \gamma_{1}(H_{st} - 1) + \gamma_{2} H_{2t}$$

$$= \gamma_{g} - (\gamma_{g} - 1) H_{st} - (\gamma_{1} - \gamma_{2}) H_{2t}$$

where we used (5) and that $H_{jt-1} = 1$, $H_{jt} = 1 - H_{st}$, and $H_{jt} = H_{st} - H_{2t}$.

$\Delta \hat{Y}_{jt}^{la} < 0$ iff

$$(\gamma_{g} - \gamma_{1}) H_{st} + (\gamma_{1} - \gamma_{2}) H_{2t} > 0$$

Since $\gamma_{g} > \gamma_{1} > \gamma_{2}$ and we know that $\Delta H_{st} > 0$, a sufficient condition is that $\Delta H_{2t} \geq 0$. 

44
We continue with the Paasche Quantity Index with period $t$ as the base year for prices:

\[
\frac{1}{\tilde{Y}_{t}^{pa}} = \frac{P_{gt}C_{gt-1} + P_{1t}C_{1t-1} + P_{2t}C_{2t-1}}{P_{gt}C_{gt} + P_{1t}C_{1t} + P_{2t}C_{2t}}
\]

\[
= \frac{P_{gt}C_{gt}C_{gt-1}}{P_{gt}C_{gt} + P_{1t}C_{1t} + P_{2t}C_{2t}} + \frac{P_{1t}C_{1t}C_{1t-1}}{P_{gt}C_{gt} + P_{1t}C_{1t} + P_{2t}C_{2t}} + \frac{P_{2t}C_{2t}C_{2t-1}}{P_{gt}C_{gt} + P_{1t}C_{1t} + P_{2t}C_{2t}}
\]

\[
= \frac{H_{gt}A_{gt-1}H_{gt-1}}{H_{t}A_{gt}H_{gt}} + \frac{H_{1t}A_{1t-1}H_{1t-1}}{H_{t}A_{1t}H_{1t}} + \frac{H_{2t}A_{2t-1}H_{2t-1}}{H_{t}A_{2t}H_{2t}}
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{\gamma_{g}}H_{gt-1} + \frac{1}{\gamma_{1}}H_{1t-1} + \frac{1}{\gamma_{2}}H_{2t-1}
\]

where we used (5) and that $H_{t} = 1$, $H_{gt-1} = 1 - H_{st-1}$, and $H_{1t-1} = H_{st-1} - H_{2t-1}$.

\[\Delta \tilde{Y}_{t}^{pa} < 0 \text{ iff} \]

\[
\left(\frac{\gamma_{g} - \gamma_{2}}{\gamma_{g}\gamma_{2}}\right)\Delta H_{st-1} + \left(\frac{\gamma_{1} - \gamma_{2}}{\gamma_{1}\gamma_{2}}\right)\Delta H_{2t-1} > 0
\]

Since $\gamma_{g} > \gamma_{1} > \gamma_{2}$ and we know that $\Delta H_{st-1} > 0$, a sufficient condition again is that $\Delta H_{st-1} \geq 0$.

QED

**Proof of Proposition 6**

Using equation (4) and the assumption that $\hat{A}_{it} = \hat{A}_{jt}$, it is straightforward to show that

\[
\tilde{Y}_{t}^{mj} = \frac{\sum_{i=g,1,2} A_{it}H_{it}}{\sum_{i=g,1,2} A_{it-1}H_{it-1}} = \frac{A_{jt}}{A_{jt-1}} \frac{\sum_{i=g,1,2} A_{it} P_{it} H_{it}}{\sum_{i=g,1,2} A_{jt-1} P_{jt-1} H_{it-1}} = \frac{\gamma_{j}}{\sum_{i=g,1,2} (1 + \tau_{i}) H_{it}}
\]

Since the chain index is the weighted average of the Laspeyres and Paasche index, we have to show the claim for each of them. Since the proof is very similar, we report it only for the Laspeyres index. Using again equation (4) and the assumption that $\hat{A}_{it} = \hat{A}_{jt}$, we have

\[
\tilde{Y}_{t}^{ja} = \frac{\sum_{i=g,1,2} A_{it}H_{it}}{\sum_{i=g,1,2} A_{it-1}H_{it-1}} = \frac{A_{jt}}{A_{jt-1}} \frac{\sum_{i=g,1,2} A_{it} P_{it-1} H_{it}}{\sum_{i=g,1,2} A_{jt-1} P_{jt-1} H_{it-1}} = \frac{\gamma_{j}}{\sum_{i=g,1,2} (1 + \tau_{i}) H_{it}}
\]

QED
Appendix C: Details of the Calibration

Equilibrium conditions

\[ C = \left[ \frac{1}{\omega_g} C g_{\omega_g} C \frac{\sigma \alpha_1}{\sigma \epsilon g} + \frac{1}{\omega_s} C s_{\omega_s} C \frac{\sigma \alpha_1}{\sigma \epsilon s} \right] \frac{\sigma \alpha_1}{\sigma \epsilon g} = 0 \]

\[ C_s = \left[ \frac{1}{\omega_1} C_{1\omega_1} C \frac{\sigma \alpha_1}{\sigma \epsilon 1} + \frac{1}{\omega_2} C_{2\omega_2} C \frac{\sigma \alpha_1}{\sigma \epsilon 2} \right] \frac{\sigma \alpha_1}{\sigma \epsilon 1} = 0 \]

\[ 1 = L_2 - L_g - L_1 = 0 \]

\[ C_g = A_g L_g = 0 \]

\[ C_1 = A_1 L_1 = 0 \]

\[ C_2 = A_2 L_2 = 0 \]

\[ P_g = w/A_g = 0 \]

\[ P_1 = (1 + \tau_1)w/A_1 = 0 \]

\[ P_2 = (1 + \tau_2)w/A_2 = 0 \]

\[ P_s = \left[ \alpha_2 P_{2\omega_2} C \frac{\epsilon 2}{\epsilon g} + \alpha_1 P_{1\omega_1} C \frac{\epsilon 1}{\epsilon g} \right] \frac{1}{\omega g} = 0 \]

\[ \left( \frac{P_g}{P_1} \right) = \left( \frac{\alpha_2}{\alpha_1} \right) \frac{1}{\omega g} \left( \frac{C_{1\omega_1}}{C_{2\omega_2}} \right) \frac{1}{\sigma \epsilon 1} = 0 \]

\[ \left( \frac{P_2}{P_1} \right) = \left( \frac{\alpha_2}{\alpha_1} \right) \frac{1}{\omega g} \left( \frac{C_{1\omega_1}}{C_{2\omega_2}} \right) \frac{1}{\sigma \epsilon 2} = 0 \]

We solve this system of 12 equations in the following 12 unknowns:

\[ C_g, C_1, C_2, C_s, L_2, L_g, L_1, w, P_1, P_2, P_s \]

Notice that in the calibration, \( P_g \) is set equal to the price of goods that we observe in the data.

C.1 Construction of quality–adjusted labor hours

The levels of efficiency hours for 1995 are expressed in terms of quality adjusted hours. Then using the levels we use the changes in the index for efficiency hours from the WORLD KLEMS data set to calculate the levels for each year.

The quality–adjusted hours for the year 1995 were constructed as follows. The USA data in the WORLD KLEMS data set comes with a so called labor input file, which provides for each year and each industry labor compensation per hour worked in current $, total number of persons engaged and the average number of hours worked per week for 96 different types of labour. These types are defined by sex (2 types), class of worker (2 types, employed, self-employed), age (8 types), educational level (6 types), \( 2 \times 2 \times 8 \times 6 = 96 \).

We proceed in four steps. Step 1: we calculate the economy wide average of the labor compensation per hour worked for the lowest educational group (completed 8th grade or less). Step 2: we express the labor compensation per hour worked for each type of labor relative to
the average labor compensation of the lowest educational group. Step 3: we calculate quality adjusted hours for each type of labor as total hours worked per week of that type of labor scaled by the relative labor compensation we calculated in step 2. Step 4: we add up the quality adjusted hours across labor types for each level of aggregation to obtain the efficiency hour levels.
D Facts for Other Classifications

Figure 10: Postwar U.S. Structural Transformation – Efficiency Hours Worked

Relative nominal value added and efficiency hours

Relative nominal value added and efficiency hours within services

Relative productivities and prices

Relative productivities and prices within services

Ratios of sectoral nominal value added per efficiency hour

Source: WORLD KLEMS

Private economy