Key finding 00	Framework O	Calibration and solution	On solution methods O	Conclusions O
		Discussion of		
"New Keynesian Dynamics in a Low Interest Rate				

By R. Anton Braun and Lena Mareen Körber System Committee on International Economic Analysis Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Environment"

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

April 28, 2011



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- Between 1999 and 2005, the Bank of Japan held its policy interest rate flat at zero.
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- Other studies omit resource costs of price changes, Δ_{π} , which are a "wedge" between output (*GNP*) and production (*Y*): $GNP \equiv C + I + G = Y(1 - \Delta_{\pi})$
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- Least difficult to implement
- See Fuhrer and Madigan (1997)

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